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Article
Populist Property Law
ANNA DI ROBILANT
Property scholars think of property law as consisting of a small
number of highly technical forms created a long time ago by "experts, "
i.e., legislatures and courts, which are hardly accessible to non-lawyers.
This Article explores a new idea: the possibility that ordinary people, with
little or no legal training, can become active participants in the creation of
property law, directly intervening in the development of new property
forms. The Article tells the story of two nineteenth-century American social
movements that represented the "little guys "-workers and farmers-who
used their 'folk legal" imagination to develop new property forms that
would solve their most pressing needs by improving access to key
economic resources such as land or credit. The story of "populist property
law" deepens our understanding of property law in three important ways.
First, it gives us a new appreciation of how property law is produced and
organized, as well as a new perspective on the standard narrative of the
historical development of property law in America. Second, the story of
populist property law speaks to the democratic legitimacy ofproperty law,
suggesting that it has long sought a deeper level of democratic legitimacy
stemming not just from democratically elected legislatures but from the
people themselves. Third, populist property law helps us understand recent
developments in property law. The rise in income and wealth inequality in
recent decades has spurred a new wave of populist property law, and the
story of nineteenth-century populist property law helps make sense of ideas
and proposals that have arisen as a result.
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Populist Property Law
ANNA DI ROBTLANT
INTRODUCTION
Property scholars think of property law as organized around a limited
number of property forms (the fee simple, future interests, the basic forms
of concurrent interests, the four types of servitudes, and the leasehold) that
were created a long time ago by "experts," i.e., legislatures and courts. The
possibility that ordinary people, with little or no legal training, can become
active participants in the making of property law, directly intervening in
the creation of new property forms, has received virtually no attention in
the relevant literature. This Article tells the story of two nineteenth-century
American social movements that represented the lower working class of
the time-the workers and the farmers-that used their "folk" legal
imagination to develop new property forms that would solve their most
pressing needs by improving access to key economic resources. The
National Reformers' Association was a group of labor leaders and
politically ambitious newspaper editors who represented the interests of the
impoverished eastern working class and who campaigned for land reform
from the 1840s through the 1860s.2 The National Farmers' Alliance was an
organization of farmers and landless tenants, active in the 1880s and
1890s, which sought to educate farmers about the causes of the problems
they faced, such as access to land and credit, and to develop solutions to
those problems.3
While historians have written extensively about these two groups, legal
historians specifically have overlooked the role of property law. Here, I
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
On the numerus clausus principle, see Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in
Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1597-99 (2008) (defining numerus clausus as the principle of
property law only recognizing a limited and standard list of mandatory forms); Anna di Robilant,
Property and Democratic Deliberation: The Numerus Clausus Principle and Democratic
Experimentalism in Property Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 368 (2014) ("The idea that property law
recognizes only a limited menu of mandatory forms is known as the numerus clausus principle.");
Avihay Dorfman, Property and Collective Undertaking: The Principle of Numerus Clausus, 61 U.
TORONTO L.J. 467, 468 (2011) (defining numerus clausus); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, I 10 YALE L.J. 1, 3-
4 (2000) (same as above).
2 MARK A. LAUSE, YOUNG AMERICA: LAND, LABOR, AND THE REPUBLICAN COMMUNITY 3, 9
(2005).
3 LAWRENCE GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOVEMENT: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AGRARIAN
REVOLT IN AMERICA 25-26, 56, 125 (1978).
recast the stories of the National Reformers and the Farmers' Alliance as
stories about property law. Workers and farmers sought to use property
law to regain a measure of control over their lives, and to that end, they
proposed new property forms. The National Reformers proposed a
homestead law that would give impoverished eastern workers and landless
farmers property rights over a piece of land and restraints on alienation
designed to encourage security of tenure.' The Farmers' Alliance
developed the joint note cooperative; a cooperative of farmers in which
landowning members would place their individual holdings as security to
allow other members, landowners and tenants alike, to collectively
purchase, on credit, yearly supplies.' I call these property law innovations
"populist property law" because the impulse to innovate came not from
expert property circles, but from the "folk" legal wisdom of the leaders and
strategic minds of these two social movements. These innovators were not
judges, law professors, or practicing lawyers. Rather, they were labor
leaders, farmers, journalists, and politicians, often with little or no legal
training.6 Their discussions took place not in court opinions and law
reviews, but in local newspapers, such as The Working Man's Advocate,
Young America, The New York Tribune, and The Topeka Advocate. In
other words, these are rare instances where property law was designed
directly by those who were on the losing side of political and economic
life.
Populist property law has been forgotten because its proponents lost
important political battles; ultimately, they succumbed to the corporate
state and saw their legal visions implode. A wide body of literature
documents the flaws of the Homestead Act of 1862.7 The joint note
cooperative was soon abandoned, and the form that was to replace and
extend it, the Subtreasury System, was never implemented. This Article
argues that, despite its failure, the story of populist property law is still
relevant in three important respects.
First, recognizing the existence of popular lawmaking in property law
is important both descriptively and normatively. Building on an extensive
4 LAUSE, supra note 2, at 3.
5 GOODWYN, supra note 3, at 57.
6 LAUSE, supra note 2, at 2, 9-10, 54-58.
' For a comprehensive analysis of the flaws of the Homestead Act, see, e.g., Paul Wallace Gates,
The Homestead Law in an Incongruous Land System, 41 AM. HIST. REV. 652, 654-56 (1936)
(highlighting the failure of the Homestead Act to change the land systems, to end speculation and
monopolization, and explaining that other Acts limited its application); infra pp. 21-22 and related
footnotes (highlighting the Homestead Act's limitations and failure to stop speculation to the highest
land bidders).
' On the failure of the Subtreasury plan, see infra pp. 965-66 and related footnotes (listing
reasons why the Subtreasury plan failed to pass); GOODWYN, supra note 3, at 309-10 (summarizing the
eventual downfall of the farmers' cooperatives).
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body of "law & society" and "popular constitutionalism" literature,9 this
Article deepens our understanding of how property law is produced and
structured. In the prevailing account, property law has the special feature
of being organized by the "numerus clausus" principle.'o While contract
law is the domain of free innovation and customization, property law
consists of a small menu of available forms that have remained relatively
fixed in time." Legislatures are the main institutional actors responsible for
managing the menu of property forms, occasionally pruning old ones or
creating new ones, and judges do most of the day-to-day work of tweaking
existing forms.12 The story of the National Reformers and the Farmers'
Alliance shows a greater degree of innovation in property law and
magnifies the creative role of actors other than legislatures and courts. New
property forms were continuously developed through the tugs and pulls
between legislatures, courts, and ordinary citizens relying on their folk
property craftsmanship.
The story of populist property law also has normative significance,
enhancing the democratic legitimacy of property law. In recent years,
democratic property theory has emerged as a powerful alternative to long
dominant normative accounts focusing on efficiency and information
costs.13 Democratic property theory argues that, substantively, property
' On popular constitutionalism, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM & JUDICIAL REVIEW 7-8 (2005) (providing that people engaged in constitutional
politics make new constitutional law); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS 186-87 (1999) (explaining that populist constitutional law belongs to the people acting
through politics). For a useful summary of the debate on "popular constitutionalism," see KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 4-12, 18 (2007) (summarizing
fluctuations in judicial interpretive authority); Tom Donnelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work,
2012 Wis. L. REV. 159, 168 ("[P]opular constitutionalism 'does not assume that authoritative legal
interpretation can take place only in courts, but rather supposes that an equally valid process of
interpretation can be undertaken in the political branches and by the community at large."'); David E.
Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2053 (2010)
(proposing judicial elections as a form of popular constitutionalism).
'0 On the so-called numerus clausus principle in property law, see supra note 1.
"Merrill & Smith, supra note 1.
2 Dorfman, supra note 1, at 468 (arguing that the idea that legislatures are the agent responsible
for change in property law "reflects a concern about legitimate political authority"); Merrill & Smith,
supra note 1, at 60-61 (arguing that legislatures are the key agents of change in property law because
they ensure clarity, universality, comprehensiveness, stability, and prospectivity).
" Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 745, 746-50, 769 (2009) (proposing a social obligation theory of property that holds that all
individuals have an obligation to others in their respective communities to promote the capabilities that
are essential to human flourishing); di Robilant, supra note 1, at 370-71 (arguing that for some critical
resources that involve public interests, use and management decisions should be made not by a single
owner, whether private or public, but through a process that is democratic and deliberative); Dorfman,
supra note 1, at 468, 508-09 (proposing a theory of property that rests on the idea of democratic self-
governance and collective self-authorship); Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law ofDemocracy,
63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1304 (2014) ("Property Law establishes a baseline for social relations compatible
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forms should reflect the values and aspirations of a robust democratic
society and, procedurally, new property forms must be ratified through the
democratically elected legislature. 14 But, today, representative democracy
is threatened by new anxieties. Its legitimacy is undermined by unequal
access stemming from the interplay between wealth and politics, and its
ability to make good policy is jeopardized by the dysfunction of
legislatures. This crisis of representative democracy has led to a search for
new and more authentic types of political participation that take place
outside of representative institutions and closer to the people. The story of
populist property law speaks to this aspiration, showing a still deeper
dimension of property's democratic legitimacy, beyond legislative
ratification, one that has received less attention in democratic property
theory literature. In the stories told in this Article, the role of citizens in
property law is not limited to approval through their representatives in the
legislative process but starts at the level of inputs. The stimulus for
innovation came from groups of ordinary citizens motivated by their own
needs, narratives, public values, and developed informed views about
property law.
Second, the story of populist property law complicates the dominant
historical understanding of the development of American property law.
The standard narrative suggests that changes in property doctrines in the
nineteenth century reflect a steady progression towards free market
alienability and the efficient use of property. 5 Between the founding era
and the 1890s, virtually every property doctrine was revised in service of
the guiding idea of American republican government: dispersing land
ownership to encourage self-government and making land freely alienable
to allow citizens to support themselves through the productive use and
exchange of land.16 Accordingly, primogeniture and the entail were
with democracy, both as a political system and as a form of social life. .. . Basic democratic values
limit the kinds of property rights that the law will recognize and they define particular bundles of rights
that cannot be created.").
" di Robilant, supra note 1, at 370; Dorfman, supra note 1, at 501-03.
'5 GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 12 (1997) (arguing that a vision emphasizing "will as a
reservoir of great energy" is evident in the familiar interpretation of the historical development of
Anglo-American property law as the steady expansion of individual freedom of ownership, especially
freedom of transferability); MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860 131 (1977); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1376-77 (1993) (arguing
that modernity fosters alienability and that as groups modernize they tend to lengthen their standard
time-spans of land ownership and to relax traditional limits on transfer); Claire Priest, Creating an
American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in American History, 120 HARv. L. REv. 385, 392-
96 (2006) (discussing the two explanations of the development of an American property law in the
colonial era, the "decline of feudalism" explanation and the "Republicanism" interpretation).
16 See ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at I (arguing that the development of American property law
is characterized by the dialectic between the conception of property as market commodity and the
conception of property as propriety which views property as the material foundation for creating and
938 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:933
abolished, restrictions on creditors' ability to seize land in satisfaction of
debts were eliminated, and private restraints on alienation were declared
"repugnant" to the nature of the fee simple.17 In this view, it is only later-
for example, during the transformation of landlord and tenant law in the
1960s and 1970s-that concerns regarding the equitable distribution of
resources start reshaping areas of property law.
The property reforms proposed by the National Reformers and the
Farmers Alliance suggest that the evolution towards free alienability and
efficient use was less steady than that narrative would suggest; in reality,
there were periods of significant contestations and temporary reversals.' 8
Furthermore, considerations about equitable distribution existed
consistently throughout the development of American property law,
articulated with particular vehemence by people at society's margins. For
vast segments of the population in the 1860s, the promise of a piece of land
that could secure economic independence proved to be an illusion. Free
alienability led to land speculation and to the creation of a property-owning
aristocracy similar to that of Europe at the time. In the South, in the 1880s,
the crop-lien system brutally shattered small farmers' dreams of self-
sufficiency." The property innovations proposed by the National
Reformers and the Farmers Alliance-homesteading, the joint note
cooperative, and the Subtreasury-sought to restore the promise of
economic independence and security for all. To this end, the Reformers
and the Farmers pushed back against the trend towards free alienability and
reintroduced some concepts from the old feudal property law, including
restraints on alienation and exemption from creditors.20 These features
were restored in order to strengthen beneficiaries' ability to effectively use
the land and hold on to it regardless of market pressure.
Third, the story of populist property law is important because the rise
in levels of wealth and income inequality in recent decades has spurred a
new wave of populist property law. The heirs of the National Reformers
and the Farmers' Alliance are organizations such as "Americans for
Financial Reform" or "Strike Debt." The two episodes narrated in this
maintaining the proper social order); see also id at 26-42 (discussing Thomas Jefferson's civic
conception of property); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 182-
84 (1992) (attributing legal recognition of women's property rights to the republican values present in
post-revolution America); Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in
Revolutionary America, 19 J. L. & ECON. 467, 476 (1976) [hereinafter "Katz, Thomas Jefferson"]
(discussing Jefferson's argument about the connection between property and government).
" For a discussion of this sweeping reform of several doctrinal subfields of property law, see
infra Section III.B.
" See Priest, supra note 15, at 394 (describing the homestead legislation as a reversal of the
policy of free exemption of land from creditors).
" See GOODWYN, supra note 3, at 20-21 (detailing the crop lien system).
21 Homestead Act of 1862, Ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 §§ 2, 4-5 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-284)
(repealed 1976)).
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Article help make sense of the ideas proposed by these contemporary
advocates of property reform, such as the concept of "pre-distribution."21
Furthermore, the story of nineteenth-century populist property law helps
answer questions regarding the prospects of success of the reforms
proposed by contemporary advocates, such as offering homebuyers a
"sticky opt-out plain vanilla mortgage"22 or using eminent domain to seize
underwater mortgages and restructure them so that payments are
affordable.2 3 The story of nineteenth-century populist property law
suggests we should not be too pessimistic. Despite its apparent failure,
nineteenth-century populist property law had a constitutive effect, shaping
people's consciousness about what entitlements they deserve and
suggesting avenues by which people can make new claims. Further, while
these nineteenth-century reforms delivered solutions that appeared radical
and unrealistic when they were first proposed, those solutions proved
useful later, influencing some of the New Deal's programs. In other words,
while populist property law was not of immediate application, it expanded
the repertory of solutions available in the future.
This Article is structured in three sections. Section I focuses on the
first episode of populist property law-the homestead law proposed by the
National Reformers' Association in the 1840s. I explore the Reformers'
analysis of how a misguided property law system caused the concentration
of land in the hands of the few. I then discuss the Reformers' proposals:
their vision of a democratic economy and their arguments about how a
homestead law would realize this vision by expanding access to land and
strengthening security of tenure. Section fl turns to the second episode of
populist property law: the new property forms proposed by the Farmers'
Alliance in the 1890s. I describe the Alliance's analysis of how property
and contract law fueled the credit problem afflicting Southern and
Midwestern farmers. I then examine the National Farmers' Alliance's
vision of a "democracy of producers" and describe the legal-institutional
reforms that the Alliance proposed to ease the credit problem, including
production cooperatives, the joint note cooperative, and the Subtreasury
plan. Section III examines the legacy of populist property law. I discuss
how the story of populist property law changes our understanding of how
property law is produced and organized and I assess the normative
21 On the concept of pre-distribution, see infra Section III.C.
22 On the "sticky opt-out plain-vanilla mortgage," see Michael S. Barr et al., The Case for
Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 41-46 (David Moss &
John Cistemino eds., 2009).
23 See Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and
Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and Local
Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 123-25 (2013) [hereinafter Hockett, Village]
(suggesting that local governments utilize their eminent domain power to acquire and restructure
underwater mortgages).
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significance of popular lawmaking in property law. I then explain how
populist property law deepens the dominant account of how property law
developed historically in America. I conclude by exploring the parallels
between nineteenth-century populist property law and current
developments in property ideas and doctrines.
I. THE NATIONAL REFORMERS ASSOCIATION'S CAMPAIGN FOR LAND
REFORM
A. The National Reformers Association's Analysis of the "Land Crisis" of
the 1840s
The contest for land is one of the most important but understudied
conflicts of the antebellum period.24 In the decades before the Civil War,
farmers, workers, and reformers throughout the United States fought
proprietors, speculators, and railroads for greater access to land.25 An
organized land reform movement first coalesced in the wake of the Panic
of 1837 and the "First Great Depression" that followed and continued to be
felt into the 1840s.26 Land speculation was one of the causes of the Panic:
reckless credit policies had led to speculators accumulating massive
quantities of Western public lands.27 Hence, the economic depression
brought into focus the contrast between the affluence of a relative few and
the economic dependency of wide segments of the population, in particular
the impoverished eastern working class and tenants in New York's large
estates.2 8
The 1840s were not only years of economic malaise, they also
generated "one of the most fervent and diverse outbursts of reform
energy"29 in American history, where many men and women came to
24 REEVE HUSTON, LAND AND FREEDOM: RURAL SOCIETY, POPULAR PROTEST, AND PARTY
POLITICS IN ANTEBELLUM NEW YORK 5 (2000).
25 Id.
26 William F. Deverell, To Loosen the Safety Valve: Eastern Workers and Western Lands, 19 W.
HIST. Q. 269, 269-70 (1988) (discussing the origin of the movement that would eventually result in
passage of the Homestead Act).
27 Historians attribute the Panic of 1837 to a variety of political and economic variables, including
President Andrew Jackson's war on the Bank of the United States, international capital flows, an influx
of silver from Mexico, and land speculation. See, e.g., ALASDAIR ROBERTS, AMERICA'S FIRST GREAT
DEPRESSION: ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLITICAL DISORDER AFTER THE PANIC OF 1837 32-36 (2012)
(discussing the factors leading to creation of the early 1800's real estate bubble).
28 In the wake of the Panic, the theme of inequality and the need for re-shaping social relations
became dominant in popular culture. See, e.g., Nathaniel Williams, George Lippard's Fragile Utopian
Future and 1840s American Economic Turmoil, 24 UTOPIAN STUD. 166, 169 (2013) (discussing the
work of novelist and activist George Lippard and arguing that Lippard's work, particularly his novel
The Quaker City, "engaged the public's emotions by contrasting the economic instability of lower
classes with the affluence of a relative few").
29 See RONALD G. WALTERS, AMERICAN REFORMERS 1815-1860 xiii (rev. ed. 1997) (offering a
reading of the Reformers that emphasizes how the cultural and social context of the reform movements
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believe that the world did not have to be the way it was. 30 At the time, this
wave of reform energy was described as a "Sisterhood of Reforms,"
uniting the efforts of many reform movements, from the anti-slavery
movement to the women's movement to the alcohol temperance
movement.31
An organized land reform movement joined this "Sisterhood" at the
initiative of the National Reformers Association. The National Reformers
were a group of labor leaders and ambitious young newspaper editors,
some with legal training, centered in New York and under the leadership of
British-born editor George Henry Evans. 32 Evans and the National
Reformers campaigned for homestead legislation and a new land system
primarily in the pages of Evans's newspapers, The Working Man's
Advocate and The Radical." Public lands had, until then, been seen as a
source of revenue and were disposed through cash sales in an auction
system.34 The Reformers advocated for the end of cash sales and for
legislation that would give free public land to settlers who moved west.
The National Reformers represented unemployed workers in Eastern
cities, the main constituency who stood to benefit from homesteading.3 6
shaped the reform rhetoric); id. at xiv-xvi (arguing that it takes something more than economic and
social problems to generate reform movements, and that it takes more than the moral, psychological, or
sociological character of the reformers to explain a given reform movement. Walters emphasizes what
motivated individuals and the relationship between reform rhetoric and why it made sense at particular
historical moments).
30 See id. at 3 (arguing that by 1814, "a combination of theological and economic developments
led many men and women to assume that the world did not have to be the way it was and that
individual effort mattered").
" See id. at xiii-xiv (discussing utopian societies, the antislavery movement, the women's
movement, and the alcohol temperance movement).
31 See LAUSE, supra note 2, at 1-5 (providing a comprehensive introduction to the National
Reformers).
SDeverell, supra note 26, at 270.
34 See Gates, supra note 7, at 654 (contesting the conclusions of other Homestead Act scholars
and noting that prior to 1880, "large areas of the best agricultural lands in the country were subject to
sale").
" See Deverell, supra note 26, at 270 (discussing the campaign of George Henry Evans and other
reformers in support of free public land for settlers); Gates, supra note 7, at 679 (noting the strong
opposition to the cash sale system).
3 Deverell, supra note 26, at 269-70 (describing the composition of the reformers and their
interest in homesteading). Scholarly discussion of the National Reformers' land reform campaign tends
to focus on the idea of the "West as safety valve" and its ultimate failure. See, e.g., id. at 269 (noting
the campaign for the Homestead Act and the ultimate failure of the Act); Roy Marvin Robbins, Horace
Greeley: Land Reform and Unemployment, 1837-1862, 7 AGRIc. HIST. 18, 18 (1933) (describing
Horace Greeley's push to "Go West"); Fred A. Shannon, The Homestead Act and the Labor Surplus,
41 AM. HIST. REv 637, 637-38 (1936) (arguing that the Homestead Act's record of success is subject
to misinformation). Historians emphasize that the National Reformers built on a long tradition of
American agrarianism that maintained that the West, the free land beyond the frontier, would operate as
a "safety valve" to control social and economic strife in the East. See id at 640-42 (discussing the role
of "agrarian agitators" in the land reform movement). With land reform, disenchanted and unemployed
Eastern workers would be "siphoned off" to the frontier. Deverell, supra note 26, at 271. As a
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The economic depression had cast thousands of workers out of work and
pushed low wages lower. Evans and his fellow reformers reasoned that, if
emancipated through land ownership, Eastern urban workers would be
freed from dependence on employers and would have their republican
rights of independence and equality restored.37 Eastern workers rallied
under the banner, "Vote Yourself a Farm!"3 8 At the same time, Horace
Greeley-newspaper editor, reformer, and later a founder of the Liberal
Republican Party-coined his famous slogan, "Go west, young man, go
forth into the country."39 By the mid-i 840s, "land reform had captured the
imagination of almost every labor radical still active in New York." 40
Along with Eastern labor, another group pushed for land reform: the
anti-renters movement in New York. In the Hudson, Mohawk, and
Susquehanna Valleys, some 260,000 tenants farmed on long-term leases in
return for cash rents or payments in produce or labor.4 1 As changing
economic conditions made these estates less profitable, landlords sought to
squeeze more income from their tenants, and they began cracking down by
suing and evicting tenants and switching from long-term leases to annual
leases.42 Tenants soon abandoned individual obstructionism for collective
strategies. By 1845, a powerful anti-rent movement had formed, dedicated
to destroying New York's large leasehold estates and to distributing the
land to the renters who farmed it.
The National Reformers were initially cautious about an alliance with
the anti-rent insurgents; Horace Greeley characterized them as "the
unknown Gracchi of a rural neighborhood who had transformed the
pregnant language of the Declaration of Independence into an agrarian
consequence, an "independent, substantial yeomanry" would be established on the public domain,
wages would remain high in the East, and class conflict would be contained. See Robbins, supra, at 22-
25 (discussing the benefits of land reform proposed by Horace Greeley). When, after two decades of
efforts on the part of the land reform movement, the Homestead Act of 1862 finally passed, Horace
Greeley enthusiastically declared that "the clouds that have darkened our National prospects are
breaking away, and the sunshine of Peace, Prosperity and Progress will ere long irradiate the land."
HENRY NASH SMITH, VIRGIN LAND: THE AMERICAN WEST AS SYMBOL AND MYTH 201 (1970)
(explaining how Greeley was one of the main proponents of the "safety valve" theory, which stated that
the free lands beyond the frontier would operate as a safety valve to keep down social and economic
conflict in the East).
1 Deverell, supra note 26, at 270.
38 Id.
3 9 Robbins, supra note 36, at 18.
40 Deverell, supra note 26, at 270 (internal quotations omitted).
41 See HUSTON, supra note 24, at 3, 5-6 (discussing the scale of the movement, which was one of
the most powerful social movements of the Antebellum period and the largest and most sustained
farmers' movement in American history before the 1870s).
42 See id. at 77 (discussing how the crackdown triggered a new dynamic in landlord-tenant
relations). Huston uses one of the largest landlords, Stephen Van Rensselaer, as an example. After
seeing his finances thrown into shambles by the Panic of 1819, Van Rensselaer abandoned his past
lenient attitude and began a campaign to press tenants to pay their back rents. Id.
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attack on the laws of property."a' However, by 1846, Greeley had begun
working to cement a political alliance between the anti-rent movement and
the land reform movement.4
The National Reformers produced a lucid analysis of the land crisis.
America had become too similar to feudal Europe. American independence
offered a unique opportunity for Western civilization: "A new, stainless,
and untrodden world . . . a vast, an unpolluted continent which might
create a unique indigenous civilization, better, purer, higher than ever yet
appeared in the World.",45 The equality declared by the Declaration of
Independence was to be the spirit animating this new civilization. But that
promise of equality had been broken, and the Reformers were left asking,
"Why does our American Republicanism produce the same bitter fruit as
the rotten Despotism of the Old World?' 6
The reformers identified developments in property law, the wage labor
system, and slavery as the reasons why America had come to resemble
feudal Europe. Reformer Lewis Masquerier argued that erroneous legal
institutions-full-blown Blackstonian property rights such as the unlimited
rights to exclude, use, and transfer-had favored the emergence of an
American property-owning aristocracy and had ultimately ushered in an
era of inequality. 47 The reformers noted that those who have a monopoly of
the land gained a monopoly of money also. 48 In other words, the very
modern, absolute, and freely alienable property rights that were supposed
to liberate America from the vestiges of feudalism had paradoxically led to
the opposite result. Blackstonian property had facilitated "a monstrous
combination of king, temporal and spiritual lords, pensioners, professional
crafts and large and small dealers of all kinds, who are united by one
common interest to crush and plunder an unresisting people."49
Massachusetts-born Reformer Joshua K. Ingalls, a former minister
whose cause had changed from Quakerism to land reform, focused his
analysis of the causes of the new American despotism on the relationship
between ownership of land and the wage labor system."o Ingalls argued
4 Id. at 4.
44Id.
45 LAUSE, supra note 2, at 51 (internal quotation omitted).
* Id. (internal quotation omitted).
47 LEWIS MASQUERIER, SOCIOLOGY: OR, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIETY, GOVERNMENT, AND
PROPERTY 12 (1877) [hereinafter "MASQUERIER, SOCIOLOGY"] ("We are now at the turning point of
this era of inequality to its opposite of equality, as stated by Evans. We will first plan out such sliding
measures as will take society out for the ring of the present erroneous institutions.").
4 See W. Scott Morgan, Land Monopoly, in A POPULIST READER 18, 24-25 (George B. Tindal
ed., 1990).
4 JOHN HANCOCK KLIPPART, BROTHERHOOD OF THE UNION 14 (Sanford & Hayward eds., 1852).
s On Joshua K. Ingalls, see Bowman N. Hall, Joshua K. Ingalls, American Individualist: Land
Reformers, Opponent of Henry George and Advocate of Land Leasing, Now an Established Mode, 39
AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 383, 384, 393 (1980) (discussing Joshua K. Ingalls's life and work).
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that there are "two factors of production: labor and raw material." 5 i Labor
is the "active factor," while all "raw material not affected by human
activity" lies in the land.52 Labor is a normal condition of human existence,
and
[l]abor only becomes irksome and repulsive when a few by
shirking their share can throw burdensome proportions upon
others, or when, excluded from the laboratory which nature
has provided him, . . . the laborer has to beg the privilege to
toil from his fellow, who slanders their common nature by
assuming that it is laziness and not a sense of injustice and
despair, which makes hirling labor distasteful.5 1
It follows, Ingalls suggested, that "there must be complete freedom from
any and all arbitrary control over" labor and land.54 Any control over the
soil other than by the cultivating occupant "can but fetter and cripple labor
and retard production."" "The freedom of man without the freedom of the
land," Ingalls claimed, "can benefit neither."5 6
Slavery was the other factor that allowed despotism to gain a foothold
in America. Plantation slavery in the South had hardly been a concern for
eastern workers, who were exclusively focused on local conditions. The
Reformers brought the question of slavery to the forefront by coupling the
question of free land with that of free labor and by emphasizing the
fundamental affinities between non-free wage labor and non-free slave
labor." For Masquerier, the Reformers' mission was to abolish the
ownership of man's body in chattel slavery and the ownership of a man's
muscles in wages slavery." Similarly, Ingalls saw the wages system as the
natural outgrowth of the historical process that commenced with slavery
and lead to feudalism." In each case-slavery, feudal serfdom, and wage
labor-the result was that one man, whether called a master, lord or
capitalist, secured the results of another man's labor without payment in an
equivalent of his own labor.
51 d. at 390.
52 Id.
5 J.K. INGALLS, SOCIAL WEALTH: THE SOLE FACTORS AND EXACT RATIOS IN ITS ACQUIREMENT
AND APPORTIONMENT 177-79 (1885) [hereinafter INGALLS, SOCIAL WEALTH] (concluding that, on an
island of uniform surface and fertility divided equally among a certain number of people, all of whom
support themselves by raising grain, no rent would be paid because rent would be permanently and
inequitably established).
54 ld. at 187.
5 INGALLS, SOCIAL WEALTH, supra note 53, at 187.
56 Id.
5 ld. at 70.
* MASQUERIER, SOCIOLOGY, supra note 47, at 104.
SJ.K. Ingalls, Man and Property: Their Rights and Relations, in THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE 114-15
(WM. H. Channing ed., 1850).
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In 1851, in his first speech on the Homestead Act, Indiana
Representative George W. Julian, abolitionist and land reformer, argued
that homesteading would provide a "formidable barrier" against the
introduction of slavery into the territories.60 Since homesteading provided
for limited parcels of land and because slavery required extensive estates to
flourish, Julian believed that slavery could never be established in the
public lands under such a policy.6 '
B. The National Reformers' Vision of Egalitarian Freedom in an
Economic Democracy
The National Reformers contrasted the despotism that had gained a
foothold in America through land accumulation, wage labor, and slavery
with an egalitarian and radically democratic concept of freedom. 62 They
insisted that the American Revolution was still in progress, that the work
of 1776 was yet to be finished, and that their concept of egalitarian
freedom was faithful to the revolutionary spirit.63 The Reformers rejected
the usual property terminology of the age and, in particular, the Lockean
triad of "life, liberty and estate."' Instead, they invoked Jefferson's triad
of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" and focused on the actual
means of the pursuit of liberty and happiness.s
Individual reformers produced different lists of the means that allow an
individual to be free and happy. George Julian was inspired by a thought
he found in a volume of essays by Unitarian theologian William Ellery
Channing: "The grand doctrine that every human being should have the
means of self-culture, of progress in knowledge and virtue, of health,
comfort and happiness, of exercising the powers and effections of a
man,-this is slowly taking its place as the highest social truth." 66 Lewis
Masquerier's list was similar but couched in the language of natural rights.
60 James L. Roark, George W Julian: Radical Land Reformer, 64 IND. MAG. HIST. 25, 29 (1968)
(quoting GEORGE W. JULIAN, SPEECHES ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS 57, 374 (1872) and CONG. GLOBE,
31st Cong., 2d Sess. (1850)).
61 Id
62 Horace Greeley's views on land reform were influenced by British philosopher Thomas
Carlyle, who wrote that liberty did not mean simply the absence of oppression but rather requires "new
definitions." ROBERT C. WILLIAMS, HORACE GREELEY: CHAMPION OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 90 (2006).6 1 d at 315.
6 Id. at 2-4.
65 See RICHARD K. MATTHEWS, THE RADICAL POLITICS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: A REviSIONIST
VIEW 27 (1984) ("Although it can be argued that all reasonable men of that era assumed that property
was a necessary (and perhaps sufficient) prerequisite to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, that
Jefferson did not use the word is historically novel. Moreover, as will become clear later, property
ownership per se was not considered by Jefferson to be an end in itself Man was meant to be much
more than either a mere consumer or an appropriator.. . .Jefferson's vision of man and of man's telos
is much grander. Happiness is the summum bonum. More importantly every man has a natural right to
pursue it.").
" Roark, supra note 60, at 25.
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Masquerier criticized Blackstone's "commentary on the laws of England"
(which he mockingly called "the lawyers' Bible") for failing to enumerate
the full list of an individual's "natural rights": the right of "manhood, life,
reproduction, labor or self-employment, sovereignty or the power of self-
government, a share of the soil and the whole product of manual and
mental labor.'"'
The National Reformers' mission was to realize this egalitarian
concept of freedom by building genuinely new property institutions.68
Homesteading was chief among them, as it would make real every
individual's natural right to a share of the soil.69 In Horace Greeley's
words: "[The system of homesteading], with such modifications and
safeguards as wisdom and experience may suggest would rapidly cover the
yet unappropriated Public Domain with an independent, substantial
yeomanry, enjoying a degree of Equality in Opportunities and advantages
such as the world has not seen."70 This "equality of opportunity and
advantage" was to be secured for all, regardless of color or race.
Masquerier talked about a national commitment to "invite every landless
American, Mexican, Indian, White or Black Slave throughout the earth to
claim his right to an equal, individual and inalienable homestead."7 1
Some scholars have read Greeley's reference to an independent
substantial yeomanry as a sign of shortsighted conservative agrarianism.7 2
But, while the National Reformers built on the Jeffersonian idea that the
state should provide all men with the land necessary to enable them to be
good citizens in the republic, they were not agrarians animated by hostility
to modernity, industry, or growth.73 Rather, the National Reformers' ideas
67 MASQUERER, SOCIOLOGY, supra note 47, at 38 ("The most known classification of rights and
wrongs is that in Blackstone's commentary on the laws of England.... [t]t is one of the greatest drag
chains against the progress of reform and liberty. In the first place, he entirely ignores the three
essential and constituent principles of a perfect right-4hose of equalness in quantity, inalienableness
in time or duration, and of individuality by a thorough separateness.... But he is equally deficient in
enumerating all the rights. . . Instead of classifying rights as being founded on the properties of the five
great systems of the organs of the human body, as those of manhood, life, reproduction, labor or self-
employment, sovereignty or the power of self-government, a share of the soil, and the whole product of
manual and mental labor, he only particularizes the rights of 'life, liberty, and private property."').
68 See Note, Distributive Liberty: A Relational Model of Freedom, Coercion, and Property Law
Source, 107 HARV. L. REV. 859, 868-76 (1994) [hereinafter Distributive Liberty].
61 See MASQUERIER, SOCIOLOGY, supra note 47, at 56-61 (arguing for an equal, inalienable and
individual homestead).
7o Robbins, supra note 36, at 25 (quoting Horace Greeley, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 23, 1846).
7' LEWIS MASQUERIER, A SCIENTIFIC DIVISION AND NOMENCLATURE OF THE EARTH, AND
PARTICULARLY THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES INTO STATES, COUNTIES, TOWNSHIPS, FARMS
AND LOTS 12 (1847).
72 SMITH, supra note 36, at 201 (arguing that the failure of the Homestead Act shows how poor a
tool the agrarian tradition was for dealing with nineteenth century industrial society and placing
Greeley fully within this agrarian tradition).
73 See Platte County Argus, The Classes Against the Masses, in THE POPULIST MIND 41 (Norman
Pollock ed., 1967) ("Yet while this newspaper repudiated the existing form of industrial capitalism and
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fit into an alternative reading of Jeffersonian republicanism. In this
reading, Jefferson is "not the heroic loser in a battle against modernity, but
the conspicuous winner in a contest over how the government should serve
its citizens in the first generation of the nation's territorial expansion."7 4 In
other words, the Jeffersonian republicanism the National Reformers
embraced is less about an agrarian, anti-commercial bias and more about
the "commitment to growth through the unimpeded exertions of
individuals whose access to economic opportunity was both protected and
facilitated by government."7 5
The National Reformers were animated by their pledge to ensure
"equality of opportunity and advantage" so that no redistribution would be
necessary." In fact, Evans presented their proposals as a way to eradicate
the need for redistribution. As Evans put it:
Imagine the National Reform project to be rejected . . . .
Would not the oppressed millions, when driven to the last
stage of oppression, rise up to the landholders [to say] "You
have unjustly used our land and our labor to amass wealth to
yourselves; we will therefore have a fair and equal division,
and then begin anew with equal right to the soil?"
For the Reformers, redistribution raised fairness concerns and hence
they envisaged land reform as a gradual and peaceful process. For
example, for Ingalls:
[T]hose in present legal possession of land to remain so
during life or for a certain term of years.. .. [N]o one would
be dispossessed of any right he now enjoys, but be only
denied the privilege of acquiring rights hereafter which are
detrimental to the enjoyment of the natural rights of others,
and to the public welfare.7 8
The National Reformers realized that for the right to a share of the soil
to be a meaningful reality, property rights in land were to be modified. In
other words, the Reformers saw property rights not as immutable natural
rights but as positive (i.e., created by the state) and instrumental rights that
could be reshaped to secure the effective enjoyment of individuals' natural
the values of social Darwinism, the concluding remarks make it clear that it did not repudiate
industrialism per se.").
" Joyce Appleby, Commercial Farming and the "Agrarian Myth" in the Early Republic, 68 J.
AM. HIST. 833, 836 (1982).
5 Id. at 849.
76 See MASQUERIER, SOCIOLOGY, supra note 47, at 12 ("[Wie propose then, as Evans did, no
violent agrarian division... . [W]e propose the sliding measures.. . .").
" George H. Evans et al., Our Principles, WORKING MAN'S ADVOC., Apr. 6, 1844.
78 INGALLS, SOCIAL WEALTH, supra note 53, at 288.
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rights. Specifically, Evans and Masquerier believed that the natural right to
a share of the soil has three fundamental features that need to be secured
through carefully designed property laws: equality, perpetuity, and
individuality.7 9
The first feature, equality, points to the fact that while men are not
equal (as differences in physical and intellectual abilities show), they are
created with equal, basic, natural wants which can be satisfied only if men
have equal and proportional access to the soil.so The second feature,
perpetuity, means that what the principle of equality had granted, a share of
the soil, was to be perpetually maintained, i.e., that no individual could
alienate or be deprived of her share of the soil." Finally, the third feature,
individuality, suggests that the right to a share of the soil is to be held
individually rather than communally.8 2
The emphasis on individuality is what sets apart the National
Reformers from the European utopian socialists and land reformers they
were in dialogue with. Although some of the Reformers had earlier
adopted the ideas of the French socialist Charles Fourier and had organized
their own communes as Fourierist phalanxes, the National Reformers as a
group came to believe that common ownership of land was a mistake.83 As
Masquerier put it, work in phalanx-like communes would resemble a slave
plantation.8 4 By contrast, Masquerier continued, "in our inalienable
homestead system all will have the sublime power of self-direction and
self-employment, be stimulated to duty by the example of neighbors and an
independent vote in the councils of the commune, and in all other
things.""
C. The National Reformers' Legal Innovations: Homesteading
How could property law make real the promise of an equal, perpetual
and individual right to a share of the soil?
Few among the National Reformers had any legal training or
familiarity with the technicalities of property doctrine. Evans had entered
the printing business at an early age and was a publisher and political
" Id. at 40-41; see also George H. Evans, et al., Equal Right to Land, WORKING MAN'S ADVOC.,
Mar. 16, 1844 (noting that every man should be able to "apply his labor to the cultivation of the soil or
in any other manner that may seem best to him, with full liberty to dispose of the fruits of that labor in
any manner that shall not involve a monopoly of the land.")
" MASQUERIER, SOCIOLOGY, supra note 47, at 40; Evans, et al., supra note 79.
"' MASQUERIER, SOCIOLOGY, supra note 47, at 40-41; Evans, et al., supra note 79.
82 MASQUERIER, SOCIOLOGY, supra note 47, at 41; Evans, et al., supra note 79.
8 On Fourier's influence on the National Reformers, see LAUSE, supra note 2, at 15; WILLIAMS,
supra note 62, at 95.
4 MASQUERIER, SOCIOLOGY, supra note 47, at 21.
5 Id
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organizer throughout his life." Joshua K. Ingalls was a self-taught
economist who, in the words of his biographer, "failed to proffer any
improvements in the method of the economic theorist" and did not even
comprehend Ricardo's rent theory, but Ingalls is worth remembering in the
"history of opinions" branch of economic thought." The only lawyer
among the strategic minds of the National Reform Association was Lewis
Masquerier. Masquerier studied law, "was examined and licensed by the
celebrated Judges Bledso and Brown," and established his own practice in
Quincy, Illinois-though he quickly abandoned it." As Masquerier
recounted in his autobiography, "I .. . had such poor taste for it that I gave
myself up to miscellaneous studies."" Masquerier devoted the rest of his
life to farming, inventing a new phonetic system, and writing and lecturing
about sociology.90
The Reformers believed in the need for periodic critical and
democratic reevaluations of property rules by citizens. Masquerier noted
that the Declaration of Independence asserts that "all the sovereign power
of the government resides in the whole people; that they cannot be bound
by a law which has not received their consent; that they can at all times
alter or abolish any law, government or alliance which has become
oppressive and substitute others."9 ' Masquerier was elaborating on a
Jeffersonian theme-Jefferson sought to keep the Spirit of 1776
perpetually alive by institutionalizing revolution.92 For Jefferson, the earth
belongs to the living.93 Each generation should exercise its natural right to
create anew its political life and property rights. Jefferson illustrated this
principle by pointing to France: if implemented by the French, this
8 See MASQUERIER, SOCIOLOGY, supra note 47, at 93-99 (detailing Evans's history). Evans
learned the printing business at an early age, established his own office and "commenced the
publication of works of a reformatory character." Id at 93. Masquerier adds that Evans "early espoused
the cause of the anti-monopoly workingman's party, having for his co-laborers Thomas Skidmore and
William Leggett. These made a powerful opposition to the banking system." Id.
8 Hall, supra note 50, at 395 (arguing that, "[i]t would obviously be naive to suggest Joshua K.
Ingalls as a candidate for enshrinement as a figure worth remembering in the history of economic
analysis. He failed to proffer any improvements in the method of the economic theorist and he was
unaware, even as late as the 1890s, of the significance or apparently the existence of the marginal
revolution. Worse still, he was writing about the land question without even comprehending the
Ricardian rent theory. Yet he is of interest, and indeed significance, in ... the 'history of opinions'
branch of the history of economic thought. A study of Ingalls re-establishes the sometimes forgotten
fact that land reform was a part of the radical movement in nineteenth-century America for an extended
period of time and was also part of the beginnings of the progressive movement that was to blossom in
the early 2 0 ' century.").
8 MASQUERIER, SOCIOLOGY, supra note 47, at 135.
89 Id.
9 Id.; see also LEWIS MASQUERIER, A NEW PHONOTYPHIC PRONOUNCING AND DEFINING
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1877).
91 LAUSE, supra note 2, at 69.
92 See MATTHEWS, supra note 65, at 21 (noting Jefferson's need for permanent revolution).
93 Id. at 75.
950 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:933
radically democratic principle would have challenged the foundations of
the feudal property structure of the Ancien Rigime.94 It would have
encouraged citizens to confront such questions as:
[W]hether the nation may change the descent of lands holden
in tail, [w]hether they may change the appropriation of lands
given anciently to the church, to hospitals, colleges orders of
chivalry, and otherwise in perpetuity[, and] whether they may
abolish the charges and privileges attached on lands,
including the whole catalogue ecclesiastical and feudal.95
The Reformers were self-taught lawyers who gained a limited
knowledge of property law for the purpose of sketching out their proposal
for a homestead law. Their proposal was iconoclastic. It was based on the
unorthodox belief that individuals' right to a share of the soil could be
made effective and secured in the long term only by reversing the trend
towards full-blown Blackstonian property rights and free alienability of .
land that had characterized American property law from the colonial era to
the late-nineteenth century. The Reformers argued for restoring some of
the elements of old common law property that had been rejected as
"feudal" in the post-revolutionary era, such as restraints on alienation,
exemptions from creditors, and owners' positive duties.96
Historians of property have documented in detail this sweeping trend
towards the free use and alienability of land. After the Revolution, the
English common law was largely maintained in property law, where
"exception was quickly and loudly taken." The new American property
law rejected the feudal features of the English common law. 98 By contrast,
it would disperse ownership of land and promote free alienability and the
productivity of land. This movement started with the reform of the law of
inheritance, which Thomas Jefferson, in his Notes on the State of Virginia,
ranked at the top of his list of needed alterations to the common law, even
above the statute on religious freedom.99 Many states soon passed statutes
94 d at 21.
95 Id.
9 See Distributive Liberty, supra note 68, at 862-75.
1 John V. Orth, After the Revolution: "Reform" ofthe Law oflnheritance, 10 L. & H IST. REV. 33,
33(1992).
9 Id. at 33-34.
9 Id. at 33. The literature on the reform of the law of inheritance in America is vast. See, e.g.,
Holly Brewer, Entailing Aristocracy in Colonial Virginia: "Ancient Feudal Restraints" and
Revolutionary Reform, 54 WM. & MARY Q. 307, 307-09, 345-46 (1997) (discussing the
transformation of inheritance law in colonial Virginia); John F. Hart, "A Less Proportion of Idle
Proprietors": Madison, Property Rights, and the Abolition of Fee Tail, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167,
168-71, 193-94 (2001) (discussing James Madison's support for the abolition of fee tail and the
practical, procedural and symbolic effects of the abolition of fee tail in Virginia); Stanley N. Katz,
Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV. I
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abolishing primogeniture, the rule that real property held by a person who
died without a last will passed to the first born child.'o Virginia and North
Carolina were the first to abolish the entail, a means of restricting future
succession of real property to the descendants of a designated person.' 0 '
Restrictions on creditors' ability to seize land in satisfaction for debts
were similarly abolished.' 02 Under the English common law, an
individual's freehold interest in land was exempt from the claims of
unsecured creditors.o3 With the "Act for the More Easy Recovery of
Debts," the British Parliament had made land legally equivalent to chattel
property for purposes of debt collection in all British colonies in America,
even before the Revolution.' 04 Claire Priest's wonderful study of the Act
shows how it increased the treatment of land as a commodity and expanded
the market for land in America.' 05
Another landmark in the march towards alienability was the revision of
restraints on alienation.'0 6 Chancellor Kent's Commentaries on American
Law suggested that the courts should refuse to enforce restraints imposed
by private will because they were "repugnant to reason."'0 7 Accordingly,
1-4, 26-29 (1977) (discussing the history of the laws of inheritance during the American Revolution
era and the effects of reforms); Katz, Thomas Jefferson, supra note 16, at 467, 469-81 (discussing
Thomas Jefferson's role in reforming the laws of inheritance); Richard B. Morris, Primogeniture and
Entailed Estates in America, 27 COLUM. L. REv. 24, 24-27, 50-51 (1927) (discussing the
"development of the doctrine of the descent of entails" and how "the rule of partible descent evolved");
Carole Shammas, English Inheritance Law and Its Transfer to the Colonies, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HisT.
145, 145, 161-63 (1987) (comparing English inheritance law to the inheritance laws in the colonies).
"n See Morris, supra note 99, at 25 (noting that the demise of primogeniture antedated the rise of
republicanism). Every New England colony except Rhode Island had abolished it before the end of the
seventeenth century and that by the outbreak of the Revolutionary War it had vanished everywhere
north of the Mason-Dixon line except of aristocratic New York. The Southern colonies generally
hewed closer to the old common law, and primogeniture in Revolutionary America was as peculiarly
southern as slavery. Georgia led the way in abolishing primogeniture in 1777, and Virginia abolished
primogeniture in 1785. Id.
"o' Id. at 34.
02 See Priest, supra note 15, at 387-88 ("[In England,] [t]he legal restrictions on creditors' ability
to seize land in satisfaction of debts helped to stabilize the landed class by protecting real property
holdings from the risk associated with accumulated unsecured debt. This legal structure, however, on
the margin, was likely to have reduced capital available for productive investment.").
103 Id
04 See id. at 395 ("[B]y making land legally equivalent to chattel property for purposes of debt
collection in all British colonies in America, Parliament pushed colonial society away from the model
of the English aristocracy in 1732. Thus, decades before the Revolution, English inheritance law was
partially repealed at the instigation of the English, and not as the consequence of the ideological
opposition to English political and social life.").
05 See id. at 398 (arguing that the "most important consequences of the Act were ... its role in
prioritizing commercial interests over the inheritance of land[,] . . . its role in providing the credit
conditions for expanding slave labor in America" and the fact that it "expanded the market for land,
advanced the economy in America toward modem capitalism").
'06 See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 147-52 (2006)
(discussing the transformations in the doctrine of restraints on alienation).
107 Id. at 144.
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nineteenth-century common law courts declared restraints on alienation to
be unreasonable, or even repugnant to the very nature of the fee simple. 08
The Reformers' reasoned that the doctrines that were supposed to
secure dispersed ownership of land for owners who were free to use and
alienate their land had not prevented the accumulation of land in the hands
of speculators, but instead facilitated it.'09 In an insecure and volatile
economy, marked by the periodic "panics" that accompanied the
development of capitalism in the United States, alienability doctrines made
owners vulnerable.110 When faced with economic hardships, owners would
lose their land to speculators or creditors." The Reformers' intuition was
that some security of tenure could be achieved by restoring the very
features of property law that learned property lawyers and courts believed
had allowed the formation of a property-owning elite in England.112 Hence,
in the Reformers' proposed homestead law, beneficiaries would get a
parcel of land and a carefully crafted "bundle" of entitlements that included
feudal, anti-alienability devices.' 13 This attempt to create a safety net for,
owners through anti-alienability mechanisms directly conflicted with the
ideas of "official" property circles and was at odds with the logic and
values of market capitalism.11 4
To ensure the principle of equality, the National Reformers argued that
this "bundle" should include a land limitation, or a cap on the amount of
land any individual could own."' Allowing limitless ownership of a finite
resource, the National Reformers felt, reduced the number of property
owners, while placing a limit on land ownership "would increase the
landed estates generally belonging to families."" 6 "The true measure for
the size of an equal homestead," Masquerier reasoned, "must be
determined by what the natural wants require for a family support, and as
much as each can cultivate with proper recreation."17 Evans and
Masquerier envisioned a system in which public lands would be divided
into "township[s] of quarter sections of 160 acres each, and as population
108 See id. at 145 (explaining the notion of repugnancy).
109 See Distributive Liberty, supra note 68, at 862-75.
110 See id.
" See id.
112 See id
113 See id.
114 See id
us See MASQUERIER, SOCIOLOGY, supra note 47, at 56-57 (discussing the "equal homestead"
principle).
116 LAUSE, supra note 2, at 3.
117 See MASQUERIER, SOCIOLOGY, supra note 47, at 56-57 ("The true measure for the size of an
equal homestead must be determined by what the natural wants require for a family support, and as
much as each can cultivate with proper recreation. Where population is sparse, each family might be
allotted one hundred and sixty acres, then be quartered into forty acres, and again quartered down to the
minimum often acre homesteads, as an increase of heirs, etc., demands.").
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increases, into 40 acres, and then subdivided into four quarters again, down
to 10 acres, the least number of acres possible for family support."' "
Additionally, the National Reformers proposed a positive duty to
reside on and cultivate the land or, in towns, to use it for small manufacture
for a period prior to receiving title and inalienability during that time. In
arguing for a use requirement, the Reformers sought to make the promise
of an equal right to a share of the soil a long-term reality and to avoid
accumulation in the hands of large owners. They had in mind the failure of
the military bounty acts in the United States and of the enclosures in
continental Europe."' In both cases, the new owners, pressed by economic
need and discouraged by the costs and uncertainties of putting the land to
productive use, ended up losing their newly acquired lots to speculators or,
in Europe, to a rising middle class eager to invest in land.
The National Reformers also drastically restrained the beneficiary's
ability to alienate the lot in order to secure the benefits of land ownership
in the long term. Evans and Masquerier reasoned that the "equalness ... of
each one's natural right to a share of the soil will become alienated or
destroyed without the guaranteeing principle of inalienation, perpetuity or
imprescription that attaches it to the person throughout life."'20 Hence, "the
homestead . . . which embraces the improvements as well as the soil, must
never be subject to any liability to alienate for any consideration whatever,
such as that of sale, debt, tax, mortgage, primogeniture etc."l2' The
Reformers went so far as to suggest making the sale of a homestead for
money a felony. 2 2 Thus, homesteads could be traded for land to allow for
migration and possible improvement, but they could not be traded for
goods or money or offered as a lien and would be exempt from loss due to
taxes and debts. This proposal was drastic, but it contributed to
rehabilitating restraints on alienation and homestead exemption from
creditors in official property circles. The Homestead Act, passed in 1862,
introduced a temporary restraint on alienation in the five-year period
" Id at 19.
"' On the fate of the military bounty acts, see LAURA JENSEN, PATRIOTS, SETTLERS, AND THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 149 (2003) (arguing that "[v]eterans used their warrants as
land-office money, exchanging their land entitlements for cash"). On the failure of land reform in
Europe, see Anna di Robilant, Common Ownership and Equality of Autonomy, 58 McGILL L.J. 263,
282-87 (2012).
120 MASQUERIER, SOCIOLOGY, supra note 47, at 57 ("But as natural wants are not only equal but
are also continued through life they become the true foundation also of inalienable homestead. As the
principle, too, of time or duration is very different from that of magnitude or quantity, it becomes a
distinct constituent of a thorough right, and is equally essential to its existence.").
121 Id. at 58. Masquerier goes on to say that "[t]he exchange of homesteads is only proper for the
necessary freedom of emigration. No one, then, must ever be found without a homestead. For nothing
else will insure the protection of life from pauperism or starvation, the power of self-ownership, self-
employment, and self-government to the latest posterity." Id
122 See id. at 57-58 ("But it must be made a felony to withhold a home from any person, or for
any to part with it, except in exchange for another.").
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previous to receiving title as well as a duty to cultivate. 12 3
Section Four of the Homestead Act also reintroduced the homestead
exemption for creditors, stating: "That no lands acquired under the
provisions of this act shall in any event become liable to the satisfaction of
any debt or debts contracted prior to the issuing of the patent therefor."1 24
Moreover, between 1848 and 1852, eighteen states passed homestead
exemption laws.1 25 While the details of these laws varied, such as who was
eligible, what forms of property received protection, and how many acres
lay beyond the reach of creditors, the overall purpose of these laws was to
offer permanent security to families.
The Reformers believed that the bundle of ownership entitlements they
imagined would democratize property ownership. They hoped that a more
egalitarian distribution of land would diffuse wealth and democratize
power, but this hope proved elusory. 126  A wide body of literature
documents the failures of the Homestead Act of 1862. To begin with, the
Homestead Act was superimposed on a public lands system that greatly
limited its application.1 27 Furthermore, Congress continued policies that
vitiated the principle of land for the landless: railroad grants and the policy
of granting to the states federal lands that would produce revenue or
endowment for educational or other state institutions continued, and the
123 Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392, §§ 2, 5 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-284)
(repealed 1976).
124 Id.
125 Paul Goodman, The Emergence of Homestead Exemption in the United States:
Accommodation and Resistance to Market Revolution, 1840-1880, 80 J. AM. HIST. 470, 470, 472
(1993).
126 See Carlos A. Schwantes, The Concept of the Wageworkers' Frontier: A Framework for
Future Research, 18 W. HIsT. Q. 39, 41-44, 47-53 (1987) (writing on The Homestead Act, its fatal
flaws, and how it failed to help Eastern workers). Unemployed workmen in eastern cities lacked the
capital to travel west and to establish a farm, as well as technical farming skills. Hence, "the search for
independence in the American West often ended where it began: with the dreariness of wage work."
Deverell, supra note 26, at 269 (referencing Schwantes's article).
127 Gates argues that the Homestead Act did not completely change our land system; it "merely
superimposed upon the old land system a principle out of harmony with it." Gates, supra note 7, at 654.
[S]peculation and land monopolization continued after [the Act's] adoption as
widely perhaps as before, . . . homesteading was generally confined to the less
desirable lands distant from railroad lines, and . . . farm tenancy developed in
frontier communities in many instances as a result of the monopolization of the land
Other acts in existence in 1862 [the Pre-Emption law, the commutation clause of the
Homestead Act, the Timber and Stone Act, and the Desert Land Act] greatly limited
its application and new laws further restricting it were subsequently enacted. The
administration of the law, both in Washington and in the field, was frequently in the
hands of persons unsympathetic to its principle, and western interests, though
lauding the act, were ready to pervert it.
Id at 655-56 (citation omitted).
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cash-sale system was maintained until 1888.128
The hopes of the Reformers proved elusory also in another respect.
Evans and Masquerier had envisaged a homestead law that would benefit
every landless person, whether White, Black, or Indian. The National
Reformers' press had supported the Indian cause, protesting "Indian
removal at home and U.S. involvement in suppressing a Mayan rising in
the Yucatan." 29 Evans had "placed the words of Black Hawk alongside
those of Jefferson in his publications."130 However, developments in Indian
land policy contradicted the Reformers' hopes."' At the time the
Homestead Act was passed, the government was concentrating the Indians
on reservations and making their lands available, though no uniform
principle concerning the final disposition of these lands was achieved. The
only consistent rule was that they must be sold for a consideration. Hence,
the lands taken from the Indians were redistributed not to white settlers,
but rather sold in large blocks to the highest bidders, such as capitalists and
railroads. 132
Despite the failures of the Homestead Act, the legacy of the
Reformers' campaign for homesteading was not lost. The Reformers'
belief that a homestead law could make individuals' right to share of the
soil effective and secure remained alive and inspired later proposals to
improve the Homestead Act of 1862. In the 1870s, a new "panic"
worsened the situation of eastern laborers and further highlighted the limits
of the Homestead Act as a source of relief. Plans to improve the
Homestead Act were discussed in journals and newspapers.
In 1877, Representative Hendrick Bradley Wright introduced a bill in
Congress that would expand the reach of the Homestead Act.133 Wright
realized that granting a parcel of land was not enough. The Homestead Act
had failed to reach the impoverished workingmen of the east because
travelling west was expensive and starting a farm required capital.134
Hence, Wright's proposal was to provide government loans to workers
who moved west and claimed homesteads. The proposed $500 loans would
aid homesteading families "in the commencement of a permanent farming
residence."'
Other proposals tended more towards the bizarre. 3 6 Representative
12 Id. at 656-60.
29 LAUSE, supra note 2, at 78-79.
130 Id. at 78.
"' See Gates, supra note 7, at 661-62 (noting that Indian lands had to be "sold for a
consideration, which, of course, denied the homesteader the right to enter them for free").
1
32 Id at 661.
" Deverell, supra note 26, at 273.
34 Id
"' Id at 275 (internal quotations omitted).
36 Id at 274.
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Benjamin Butler, for example, reasoning that the military was allied with
capital against workers, suggested providing homesteaders with both
money and guns.13 7 Still other proposals focused on the homesteaders'
need for a government supply of water for irrigation.' 38 In other words,
despite an initial failure, the ideas of Evans and his fellow Reformers
encouraged others in the following decades to recognize the discrepancy
between the promise and the reality of the Homestead Act and to seek
innovative solutions.
II. THE NATIONAL FARMERS' ALLIANCE AND THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS TO
CREDIT: COOPERATIVES AND THE SUBTREASURY SYSTEM
A. The National Farmers'Alliance's Analysis of the Agricultural Crisis
By the 1880s, when Agrarian Populism gained momentum, the
question of land reform had become part of a larger agenda focused on
access to the means of production, the most important of which was credit.
The 1870s had been distressing years for the nation's farmers.13 9 During
the Civil War, Congress-under relentless spending pressure-had
authorized the issuance of "legal tender treasury notes" (also known as
"greenbacks" because of the color of their ink).1 40 After the war, the return
to hard money was facilitated by contracting the currency. To the nation's
farmers, contraction was an enormous tragedy, resulting in a protracted and
dramatic fall of farm prices.1 4' Farmers lost their land and lacked the
capital needed to buy supplies. In the South, the crop lien system, whereby
a farmer would buy supplies on credit from a furnishing merchant, became
a form of bondage similar to slavery for millions of farmers.1 42 At the same
time, the power of terminal grain elevator companies to fix prices and to
establish both grading standards and railroad rate structure further
13 Id.
"' For an analysis of the causes, see NORMAN POLLACK, THE POPULIST RESPONSE TO
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 7 (1962) [hereinafter POLLACK, THE POPULIST RESPONSE].
'" Timothy A. Canova, Symposium, Lincoln's Populist Sovereignty: Public Finance of by, and
for the People, 12 Chap. L. Rev. 561, 564 (2009).
'' See GOODWYN, supra note 3, at 10-12 (detailing the extent to which farmers were hurt with
the following example: "[L]etting ten farmers symbolize the entire population, and ten dollars the entire
money supply, and ten bushels of wheat the entire production of the economy, it is at once evident that
a bushel of wheat would sell for one dollar. Should the population, production, and money supply
increase to twenty over a period of, say, two generations, the farmers' return would still be one dollar
per bushel. But should population and production double to twenty while the money supply was held at
ten-currency contraction-the price of wheat would drop to fifty cents. The farmers of the nation
would get no more for twenty bushels of wheat than they had previously received for ten.").
14 See id. at 20 (arguing that the humiliating conditions of the crop lien "were so pervasive in
their impact, shaping in demeaning detail daily options of millions of Southerners, that they constituted
a system that ordered life itself').
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narrowed the possibilities of farmers.1 43  Some farmers formed
organizations for economic and political self-help, such as the Patrons of
Husbandry (or Grange).144 But by the 1880s, it was evident that things
were worse than they had been in the previous decade and that self-help
efforts of a new scale and breadth were needed.
In 1877, a group of farmers and landless tenants gathered at a farm in
Lampsas County, Texas, and formed the Farmers' Alliance.1 45 Its purpose
was to allow farmers to self-educate about the causes of the problems they
faced and to defend themselves from economic exploitation.1 46 The
Alliance was a system of agrarian self-help more ambitious and far-
reaching than any before. The organizational effort of the Alliance was
impressive. By the mid-1880s, the Alliance had grown into a diffuse
network of county alliances. The members and leaders of the National
Farmers' Alliance had no legal training; they were farmers schooled in the
harsh system of the crop-lien.
The Alliance developed a system for members' education.1 47 S.O.
Daws, a thirty-six-year-old farmer from Mississippi who was a compelling
speaker and had developed a sense of personal and political self-respect,
was named the "Travelling Lecturer" and appointed sub-lecturers in each
county.148 Through self-education they developed their own understanding
of how existing legal institutions had facilitated wealth inequality and
brought farmers to heel. A statement from the Alliance in 1890 argued that,
"a lapsed vigilance at the close of a terrible war allowed class legislators to
frame the laws controlling the financial affairs of the country . . . 4In a
41 Id. at 71.
'4 See John G. Miles Jr., The Impact of the Granger Movement Upon Social Legislation, in
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INFLUENCE OF THE GRANGE 10, 12-13 (National Grange 1967) (discussing the
Grange's conception and spread from 1873 to 1875); see also SOLON JUSTUS BUCK, THE GRANGER
MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION AND ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND
SOCIAL MANIFESTATIONS, 1870-1880 (1963) (examining the history of the Granger Movement).
' W.L. GARVIN & S.O. DAWS, HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL FARMERS' ALLIANCE AND CO-
OPERATIVE UNION OF AMERICA Viii (1887).
"n See id ("We aim to educate our members upon public questions affecting the welfare of the
people in general, and especially of the laboring classes. Most of the public speakers in this country
confine themselves to ideas gathered from the newspapers, which are too often paid to publish articles
tending to mislead the people. It is our purpose as an organization to study and understand certain
economic principles which underlie our structure of government, and upon which our prosperity as a
people and our continued existence as a Republic depend.").
14 GOODWYN, supra note 3, at XVIII (describing agrarian populism as a case study of how
democratic mass protest happens). Goodwyn sees it as a sequential process involving four stages: the
creation of an autonomous institution where new interpretations can materialize that run counter those
of the prevailing authority ("the movement"), the creation of a tactical means to attract masses of
people ("the movement recruiting"), the achievement of a heretofore unsanctioned level of social
analysis ("the movement educating"), and the creation of an institutional means whereby the new ideas
can be expressed in an autonomous political way ("the movement politicized"). Id.
*Id at 27.
' Editorial, Farmers' Alliance, Lincoln, Nebraska (Sept. 6, 1890), in THE POPULIST MIND 37
(Norman Pollack ed., 1967) [hereinafter THE POPULIST MIND].
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similar vein, Nelson Dunning, associate editor of the Alliance weekly
paper The National Economist, noted, "the American farmer in his present
condition, is a living example of the folly and disaster which inevitably
follow where one class of citizens permits another to formulate and
administer all economic legislation.""o Specifically, the Alliance's
analysis focused on two legal issues: the legislation regarding public lands
and the crop lien.
W. Scott Morgan of Arkansas, a farmer, journalist, and the Alliance's
"historian," offered a lengthy critique of the public lands laws in his
"official history" of the Alliance, published in 1889. Scott Morgan was
writing at a time of sharp conflict between farmers and corporate land
syndicates over competing claims to land. To the farmers, the syndicates,
based in New York and London, represented alien land ownership, land
monopoly, and lawlessness that hampered rural progress, capital
improvements, and settlement.15 ' Scott Morgan reaffirmed the importance
of the equitable distribution of land:
To encourage progress, induce invention and reward genius,
it may be urged that inventors may for a time reap the
benefits of their skill and industry. But such cannot be said of
land, it is the gift of God. It is the source from whence the
human family obtain their means of subsistence. From its
fertile resources flows all wealth. Upon its proper and
equitable distribution depends the happiness, comfort and
prosperity of the people.'5 2
Scott Morgan went on to note,
[The] disposition of public lands is a question of vital
importance. The existing public land laws . . . amount to
class legislation that has helped establish a land aristocracy.
The soul of American democracy and independence has been
crushed out of our institutions, while the spirit of
monarchical despotism is gestating." 3
By 1889, when Scott Morgan published his history of the Alliance, the
contradictions and loopholes of the laws and policy concerning public
lands were manifest. By 1890, the government had granted railroad
"so Nelson A. Dunning, The Farmers' Alliance History and Agricultural Digest, in A POPULIST
READER: SELECTIONS FROM THE WORKS OF AMERICAN POPULIST LEADERS 98 (George B. Brown
Tindall ed., 1966) [hereinafter A POPULIST READER].
'"' See CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST VISION 28 (2007) (describing the "land fever" in Texas
in the 1880s, and the fence wars that took place "where farm settlement pushed into grazing lands
claimed by corporate land syndicates").
5' W. Scott Morgan, History of the Wheel and the Alliance and the Impending Revolution, in A
POPULIST READER, supra note 150, at 24.
" Id. at 19.
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companies an amount of land almost equal to the thirteen original colonies,
and larger than the whole of England and France combined.154 The amount
of land in the hands of the twenty-seven largest foreign speculators was
equal to a territory as large as Ireland.'s Scott Morgan predicted that "[i]f
we take the rate at which the public lands have been going for the last
twenty-five years as a basis, there will not be at the end of fifteen years
more, one acre of government land to be had."'56
Land was also not the only resource held from farmers. Access to
credit was equally important to farmers' lives and the crop lien form
effectively kept it from them."' Farmers in the South lacked the capital to
buy supplies.' The crop lien allowed farmers to receive commodities such
as food, supplies, and seeds on credit from a "furnishing merchant" and to
pay this debt back after their crop was harvested and sold.159 The amount
of credit farmers received was based on the estimated value of the crop.1 6 0
Farmers paid very high interest rates, often well in excess of 100%
annually, and sometimes up to 200%.161 Caught between high interest rates
and low commodity prices, farmers were hardly ever able to pay out.162
Once a farmer had signed his first crop lien, he was in bondage to his
merchant as long as he had failed to pay out.1 63
The Farmers' Alliance decried the opacity and power asymmetry of
the crop-lien contract." However, neither the furnishing merchants nor the
farmers alone deserve blame; as the Reverend Charles H. Otken, a Baptist
minister of Mississippi associated with the Alliance, wrote, "the
commercial contract under whose articles they formed a joint
copartnership to do business, deserves full and signal justice."' 65 When a
merchant agrees to furnish a farmer, all the farmer knows is that he must
pay the prices determined by the merchant.1 6 6 "The [farmer] is enveloped
in mists. He travels in the dark twelve months in the year."l67 "The size of
the crop, the price of cotton, and the purchases made, determine the size
1 Id. at 22.
" Id. at 23.
56 Id. at 24.
"' See WILLARD W. COCHRANE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE: A
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 111 (1993) (discussing how access to credit was a central problem for farmers
throughout the nineteenth century); GOODWYN, supra note 3, at 20-25 (discussing the crop lien
system).
' GOODWYN, supra note 3, at 20-25.
15 Id160 Id.
162 Id.
163 For a vivid description of the difficulties of the crop lien system, see id. at 21.
16 Id. at 20-25.
6' Charles H. Otken, The Credit System, in A POPULIST READER, supra note 150, at 42, 47.
' Id. at 43.
167 Id
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and the number of balances... . A slight improvement one year is reversed
by an unfavorable crop year the next." 168 In other words, the crop lien is a
covenant in which one party, the furnishing merchants, is "thoroughly
organized, thoroughly systematic in keeping accounts, thoroughly
acquainted with the cost and selling price of merchandise, and thoroughly
informed as to their expenses," 69 while the other is "thoroughly
unorganized, thoroughly unsystematic, thoroughly uninformed as to prices
and as to their ability to pay them, thoroughly in the dark as to what their
product will be or its price, and thoroughly in the dark as to their expense
account."170 This "indefinite plan of purchasing, and ignorance of the
amount bought until the cotton has been sold is a source of disaster to the
country," Otken argued."' Every year, because of the crop lien, more and
more farmers who held a fee simple title to their farm lost it to their
furnishing merchant and became his tenants.17 2
B. The National Farmers' Alliance's Vision of a "Democracy of
Producers"
To contrast with the oppressive power of land syndicates and
furnishing merchants, the National Farmers' Alliance offered its vision of
an alternative capitalism based on a democracy of producers." The
admittedly controversial suggestion that the Agrarian Populists offered a
constructive, normative vision requires an explanation. Historians have
long offered an account of Agrarian Populism that casts it as a
retrogressive movement rejecting progress and failing to comprehend the
'" Id at 44-45.
169 Id. at 47-48.
'oId at 48.
'
7 Id at 45.
172 See id at 47 ("Thus it is that not a few farmers in the South who held a fee-simple title to their
property, lost all in ten years.").
" For the emphasis on democratic market governance, see GOODWYN, supra note 3, at 66-67
(describing the Alliance cooperative vision as the means to build a democratic economy); id. at 294
("Populism in America was not the sub-treasury plan, not the greenback heritage, not the Omaha
Platform. It was not, at bottom, even the People's Party. The meaning of the agrarian revolt was its
cultural assertion as a people's movement of mass democratic aspiration. Its animating essence pulsed
at every level of the ambitious structure of cooperation: in the earnest probings of people bent on
discovering a way to free themselves from the killing grip of the credit system ('The suballiance is a
schoolroom'); in the joint-notes of the landed, given in the name of themselves and the landless ('The
brotherhood stands united') in the pride of discovery of their own legitimacy ('The merchants are
listening when the County Trade Committee talks') and in the massive and emotional effort to save the
cooperative dream itself ('The Southern Exchange Shall Stand')."). For an example of the Alliance's
emphasis on producers, see Lorenzo D. Lewelling, Governor, State of Kan., A Dream of the Future
(Jan. 9, 1893), in THE POPULIST MIND, supra note 149, at 51-54 (discussing a dream for the future of
producers, faith in human government, and emphasizing the need to protect producers); see also
GARVIN & DAWS, supra note 145, at 86 ("A country is truly rich when its producers are prospering").
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realities of the 1880s and 1890s.17 4 Even the historical accounts that
present Agrarian Populism in a favorable light tend to focus on what the
Populists were against, rather than on what they were for."' This Article,
relying on recent scholarship, paints a different picture: one that focuses on
what the Populists stood for, and their optimistic commitment to
fashioning an alternative modernity suited to their own interests. 7 6
In his recent study of the Agrarian Populists, Charles Postel shows that
they firmly believed in progress and in the logic of modernity."' The
members of the National Farmers' Alliance were modem in two ways:
their lives were shaped by modern economic relations, and "they expressed
a modem sensibility."'78 While elements of traditional non-market farming
persisted, the Agrarian Populists' world was a modem one, both
commercially and intellectually. Cotton and wheat farmers operated in a
commercial environment that was bound to global markets, as virtually
every bale or bushel ventured into national and global trade.1 9 Farmers
recognized that the survival of their operations depended on commercial
innovation and required more direct connections to national and
international markets.' Intellectually, second-class postage brought
inexpensive newspapers and pamphlets into the farming heartland, thereby
bringing millions of men and women into the national discussion of
progress and reform."' Not only were the farmers embedded in modern
"' For the most well known articulation of this view, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF
REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO FD.R. 61-62 (1955). Hofstadter emphasized the ambiguities of Agrarian
Populism. Id. at 18 ("1 believe it will be clear that what I am trying to establish is not that the Populist
and Progressive movements were foolish and destructive but only that they had, like so many things in
life, an ambiguous character."); id. at 63-65, 70 (arguing that a number of simplistic ideas, such as the
beneficence of nature, the natural harmony of interests among the productive classes, and the simple
social classification of the people versus the interests, followed the delusive assumption that, "the
victory over injustice, the solution for all social ills, was concentrated in the crusade against a single,
relatively small but immensely strong interest, the money power," and that "[t]here was something
about the Populist imagination that loved the secret plot and the conspiratorial meeting"). For a
contrasting view that emphasizes the energy of Agrarian Populism, see POLLACK, THE POPULIST
RESPONSE, supra note 139, at 3-5 (arguing that evidence contradicts the retrogressive reading of
populism on three notable grounds: first, far from opposing technology, the agrarians "were receptive
to mechanization, scientific procedures, and the dissemination of technical information;" second, the
political solutions they offered were "concrete remedies designed to meet existing conditions," rather
than "utopian blueprints for the perfect society of independent yeomanry;" and third, the agrarians'
relationship with industrial labor involved ideological interactions and attempts at collaboration
between the two groups).
1s See POSTEL, supra note 151, at 10 ("To understand the full significance of these strivings it is
necessary to look further than what the Populists were against-abusive railroad pricing, inequitable
banking policies, and corrupt government-and to examine what they were for.").
76 Id. at 10-11.
"7 Id. at 9.
178 id.
171 See id. ("The Populist country ... was a commercial environment, bound to global markets.").
0 Id. at 16.
181 Id.
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economic relations, they also shared the modem desire for change. As
Populist novelist Hamlin Garland put it, they were moved by "a splendid
optimism" about the future, and believed that the imperfect and the unjust
could be improved.182
For the Alliance, as with the National Reformers in the 1840s,
improvement required legal and institutional innovation rather than mere
redistribution through tax and transfer. The Kansas Alliance newspaper,
The Advocate, commenting on proposals to introduce the income tax to
allow a modicum of redistribution, argued that the income tax was a good
start but was insufficient. 183 The Alliance called for new institutions that
would establish a democracy of producers, which they believed would
bring equity to the market and commercial playing field.184 The farmers
envisioned a system where market power would be distributed more
equitably from the get-go. As The Advocate's editorial put it:
Monopoly of the resources of nature and of the means of
production and distribution will have to come to an end.
Robbery under sanction of law will have to stop. Equal rights
and equal opportunities will have to become a reality....
Conditions that will permit the producer of wealth to retain
and enjoy that which he produces, will have to be established
and maintained.'
Establishing a more equitable commercial playing field would require
a broad range of innovative policies and institutions. First, a democracy of
producers would depend on institutions to ease farmers' access to land,
credit, technology, and transportation. 186 Second, a more democratic
economy would entail fostering the development of farmers' skills. 187 In
Postel's words, "[b]ecause [farmers] believed in the transforming power of
science and technology, they sought to attain expertise and knowledge for
their own improvement." 18 8 Finally, leveling the playing field would
1
82 Id. at 11.
'" Editorial, ADVOCATE, Apr. 3, 1895, reprinted in THE POPULIST MIND, supra note 149, at 57.
184 See POSTEL, supra note 151, at 15 ("The Farmers' Alliance brought a new quality to rural
associational life.... It demanded equity in the commercial playing field.").
85 Id. at 57-58.
* These were the main areas covered in the Alliance literature. See Morgan, supra note 152, at
19-20 (discussing land monopoly); Otken, in A POPULIST READER, supra note 150, at 42-43
(describing the credit problem); N.B Ashby, The Railroad Problem, in A POPULIST READER, supra
note 150, at 26-27 (describing the railroad issue); see also GARVIN & DAWS, supra note 145, at 101-02
(discussing the railroad problem).
"I See GARVIN & DAWS, supra note 145, at 84-85 (describing education as an important goal of
the Alliance); GOODWYN, supra note 3, at 20-54 (describing the development of a movement culture
and structure for self-education as an important achievement of the Alliance); POSTEL, supra note 151,
at 15 (discussing the Alliance's aspiration to create "the most powerful and complete educator of
modem times").
'm POSTEL, supra note 151, at 4.
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require new models of business organization and self-governance. Growers
of cotton and wheat sought to become a business interest like any other in
modern society, interacting on an equal footing with capitalists and
corporations.' 9 This required adapting the model of large-scale enterprise
to meet their own associative and marketing needs.' 90 An institutional
framework capable of realizing these goals, the Alliance believed, would
encourage the growth of human potential by "realizing and incarnating in
the lives of the common people the fullness of the divinity of humanity," as
Henry D. Lloyd put it in an 1894 campaign speech.' 9'
This broad vision of economic democracy was not without its dark
sides; historians have long highlighted the racist and exclusionary nature of
Agrarian Populism,1 92 and the more nuanced picture offered by recent
historical scholarship does not absolve it of these charges.1 93 As Postel
notes, in the cultural world of the Alliance, civilization was by nature white
or "Anglo-Saxon."' 9 4 With few exceptions, the communities that did not fit
this category, such as Indians and black farmers, had little room in the new
democracy of producers.' 95 White farmers pushed to open Indian lands to
white settlement and the Alliance endorsed white farmers' claims on
Indian land.' 96 Many members of the Alliance supported the Dawes
Severalty Act of 1887, which divided up tribal lands into 160-acre tracts
for Indians and parceled the rest for private purchase by white settlers.1 97
William Peffer, Alliance leader, justified the Alliance's position by
explaining that Indians had to accept the dismantling of tribal property and
give way to "the common good" 98  (however, not all farmers'
organizations supported the dismantling of tribal property; the Arkansas-
based Agricultural Wheel expressed the concern that railroads and land
syndicates would take advantage of the allotment policy to seize Indian
lands and argued that the government should protect the inalienable rights
of the Indians).1 99
On race, the opinions of the Alliance were similar to those of the rest
"9 Id. at 15.
' See id at 17.
1' CHi. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1894, reprinted in THE POPULIST MIND, supra note 149, at 69-70.
192 See POSTEL, supra note 151, at 8 ("The rise of industry, however, brought with it what
contemporaries thought of as an immigrant invasion, a massive forty-year migration of Europeans,
chiefly peasants, whose religions, traditions, languages, and sheer numbers made easy assimilation
impossible. Populism and Progressivism were in considerable part colored by the reaction to this
immigrant stream among the native elements of the population.").
193 Id at 19, 174.
1
94 Id. at 174.
19' Id. at 174-75.
' Id. at 29.
198Id.
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of Anglo-America in that they ranged from relative tolerance to lynch-
mob-level oppression and forced exclusion.200 Alliance leaders' notion of
"race progress" meant separation of the races. 201 Black farmers created
their own Alliances, 2 02 called Colored Farmers Alliances, though while
they attempted to reproduce the organizational might of the white Alliance,
they were much less successful, as they relied solely on a loose network of
supportive ministers.20 3
C. The Alliance's Proposals: Homesteading, Cooperation, and the
Subtreasury
If class legislation (public lands laws that favored speculators and
asymmetrical contract and property forms) had reduced the people to a
state of vassalage, then radically new legal institutions were needed.
"Corrupt[] legislation made us poor & only correct legislation can restore
prosperity," wrote Fanny Leake, secretary of the Farmers' State Alliance of
Texas, in 1895.204 The Alliance developed a folk legal wisdom inspired by
knowledge acquired through self-education and first-hand experience. The
Alliance realized that to be effective, legal innovation had to be informed
by knowledge of economics and business organization. In his history of the
movement, Scott Morgan noted:
[T]he only hope of reform is to . . . make a united effort.
[Farmers] are adopting systems of trade and studying
questions of political economy as they never did before.
Mistakes may occur, as no doubt they will. Their track may
be strewn with wrecks of failures; but they will move on. 2 05
The Alliance drew on personal experience in their efforts at
institutional design. Because farmers directly experienced the problem of
limited access to the means of production, they drew their answers from
that experience itself.206
To solve the problem of access to land and avoid land monopoly, the
200 Id. at 174.
201 Id
202 1d. at 174 n.178 (describing the Colored Farmers' Alliance's attempts to make the most out of
the separate but equal regime by insisting on equal).
203 Id. at 42.
2 Letters from Fanny Leake to Unidentified Persons (Aug. 5, 1895 & Oct. 23, 1895), in THE
POPULIST MIND, supra note 149, at 454.
205 Morgan, supra note 152, at 31.
206 The term "folk legal wisdom" is inspired by Norman Pollack's idea of the Populist's folk
wisdom. See POLLACK, THE POPULIST RESPONSE, supra note 139, at 9 ("The grass-roots world of
Populism is thereby opened, revealing what for me was an exciting dimension. A kind of folk-wisdom
emerges which grasps complex philosophical questions and pierces to their heart with deceptively
simple solutions. The reason behind this, while perhaps mystifying to the intellectual, is not hard to
seek. Populists lived these problems, drawing their answers from experience itself.").
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Alliance reiterated the National Reformers' earlier calls for homesteading.
At its annual meeting in Ocala, Florida, in 1890, the Alliance demanded:
[T]he passage of laws prohibiting alien ownership of land,
and that Congress take prompt action to devise some plan to
obtain all lands now owned by aliens and foreign syndicates;
and that all lands now held by railroads and other
corporations in excess of such as is actually used and needed
by them be reclaimed by the government, and held for actual
settlers only. 207
These demands are repeated in similar wording across all Alliance
platforms from 1886 to 1890.208
The folk legal wisdom of the Alliance produced new imaginative
solutions in response to the farmers' problems of access to credit and
supplies. The centerpiece of their plan was to improve and expand the
cooperative form. 2 09 By dramatically expanding the cooperative form,
farmers sought to obtain the benefits of large-scale enterprise while also
facilitating democratic self-governance.210
In the 1890s, bigger seemed better. The business corporation was
emerging as the dominant form of economic enterprise. 2 11 Courts and
jurists were struggling with developing a theory of corporate personality
that would enhance the position of the business corporation in American
law.2 12 The entity theory of the corporation, according to which the
corporation is an entity no different from the individual in its constitutional
entitlement to property rights protection, was gradually taking shape in the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.2 13
The Alliance's leaders shared the general belief that progress meant
large, concentrated economic enterprises.214 They believed in the efficiency
of large organizations that derived from economies of scale.215 To interact
with corporate power on an equal footing, the Alliance reasoned, the
207 The Ocala Platform, in A POPULIST READER, supra note 150, at 89.
208 See, e.g, The Omaha Playform of 1892, in THE POPULIST MIND, supra note 149, at 59-66
(discussing the Omaha Platform in detail).
20 For a chapter on Cooperation and Exchange in the Alliance's own official history, see GARVIN
& DAWS, supra note 145, at 84-93.
210 GOODWYN, supra note 3, at 57 (discussing the horizontal nature of the Alliance cooperative
vision); POSTEL, supra note 151, at 16-17 (emphasizing the Alliance's belief in the benefits of large
scale enterprise).
211 HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 16-17.
212 See id. at 65-73 (discussing the development of the natural entity theory and the meaning of
the Santa Clara decision, which is considered by historians to be a dramatic example of judicial
personification of the corporation that radically enhanced the position of the business corporation in the
U.S.).
213 Id. at 69 (discussing the Supreme Court's struggle with the question of corporate personality).
214 POSTEL, supra note 151, at 16-17.
215 Id.
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farmers needed to develop new methods of large-scale business
organization. 2 16 As Nelson Dunning, a national publicist for the Alliance,
put it, if the farmers of America would organize as intelligently and solidly
as the Standard Oil Company, nothing could withstand their power.2 17 The
idea was that a large-scale cooperative would provide even the smallest
producers with access to economies of scale, standardization, technology,
and regulated markets.218
Responding to objections that a plan for large-scale business
organization was inconsistent with the Alliance's attacks on trusts and
monopolies, the farmers replied that theirs was to be a monopoly that
would use its power wisely-a philanthropic monopoly for redistributing
wealth among the people. 2 19 The Alliance argued that the farmers' large-
scale business organization was to be democratic. Large-scale
consolidation seemed intuitively antidemocratic; after all, in the law of
corporations, the rise of the entity theory of the corporation had facilitated
the shift of power away from shareholders to directors and professional
managers.220
What's more, the previous experiments with farmers' cooperatives had
been far from democratic. The Grange, and later some of the local
branches of the Alliance, had founded cooperatives based on joint-stock
principles.221 In these cooperatives, management was neither democratic
nor participatory.222 Generally, the members met once a year and in the
interim a committee of a handful of managers ran the business.2 23 Any
member could attend the annual meeting but only members who owned
stock had the right to speak. 2 24 The number of shares that members owned
also determined the number of votes they had.225 The Alliance of the 1890s
recognized that the joint-stock system would facilitate "neighborhood
factions, individual or local jealousies, and family or political
differences." 226 Farmers themselves pointed to the shortcomings of the
joint stock model in letters to Alliance newspapers and started
experimenting with new forms. 227 For example, a farmer from the Prairie
Lea Alliance, in a letter to the Southern Mercury, described a cooperative
216 See id. (emphasizing the rural reformers' belief that "the future lay with organizational
consolidation and economies of scale").
217 Id. at 16-17.
"' Id. at 17.
2 19 Id at 103, 118.
220 HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 98-100.
221 POSTEL, supra note 151, at 119.
222 Id. at 120.
223 Id.
224 Id
225 Id.
226 Id. at 120-21.
227 See id. at 121 (addressing stinging letters addressed to the Southern Mercury from farmers).
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experiment that barred dividends to shareholders, eliminated profits, and
sold at cost plus expenses.228 The idea behind the experiment was to place
"the poorest [black man]" and the "meanest white man" on an equal
footing with "the best farmer in the land."22 9
The prototype for the new, large-scale democratic cooperative was the
Texas Farmers' Alliance Exchange, a giant cooperative in charge of
marketing the crops of the members and buying the supplies needed.230
Charles Macune, a doctor and farm owner from central Texas, was the
architect of the new cooperative form.231 As a marketing cooperative, the
Exchange was able to obtain prices closer to the prevailing prices on the
world cotton market.23 2  Its internal organizational structure was
straightforward. An Alliance trade committee was created and a business
agent appointed in each county. 233 The business agent, who worked
through the Alliance cotton yard established by the trade committee, would
weigh, sample, and number the bales of cotton in his local yard.234 Samples
from each bale were then sent to the Dallas Exchange, where they were
placed on display in a sample room for cotton buyers to examine. 2 35 The
effort was successful236 -export buyers came to the Exchange, and more
than a thousand bales of cotton were sold for shipment to England, France,
and Germany.237
To solve the problem of farmers' access to credit, Macune devised the
joint note cooperative. The joint note cooperative brought together more
prosperous landowning farmers and landless tenants, allowing them to
purchase needed supplies through the Exchange and collectively overcome
228 Id.
229 d
230 See GARVIN & DAWS, supra note 145, at 86 (describing the Exchange as one of the greatest
efforts ever put forth by any farmers' organization).
To resist [the pernicious influences of the mortgage and credit system] and to serve
as a protection against them and their exorbitant demands, the Exchange, national in
character, with a central head, extending its branches and striking its roots into every
nook and corner of the land and embracing as its members all who are interested in
the success of agriculture, became an absolute necessity. And by co-operation we
can overthrow the power and counteract the evil influences of the past. For with
such an arbiter as the Farmers Alliance Cotton Exchange and Commission Business
Agency, 'the hawks will make their trades with the doves' no more.
Id
231 For Macune's biography, see id at 146-47.
232 GOODWYN, supra note 3, at 74 (implying that the cooperative was able to enter the
international market).
233 See id. (suggesting that each country had a business agent who worked through the Alliance
cotton yard).234 
id
235 
id
236
237 Id.
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the need to make use of furnishing merchants. 238 Each member who
wanted supplies would provide a schedule of his needs, a showing of "full
financial responsibility," and a pledge of cotton worth at least three times
as much as the amount of credit requested. 23 9 Landowners and tenants alike
would then collectively purchase their supplies for the year through the
Texas Exchange on credit. 240 The landowners would sign the joint note and
use their land as collateral. 2 4 1 The Exchange would use the notes to borrow
money from local banks to buy the supplies.24 2 The Alliance farmers would
market the cotton collectively through the Exchange and then pay off the
joint notes at year's end. 243 The notes would draw 1% per month from the
date the supplies were shipped until the farmer had repaid the debt.2 In
addition to substantial savings in credit costs, farmers also used the
Exchange's bulk purchasing power to obtain cheaper prices on supplies.245
However, in the long run, access to credit proved to be a problem for
the Exchange, too, since bankers and wholesale merchants turned against
the Exchange and largely refused to accept the joint notes. 246 In the late
summer of 1889, unable to market its joint notes in banking circles, the
Texas Exchange collapsed. 247 The Exchange also failed in its ambition to
facilitate democratic governance. 248 The organizational structure of the
cooperative stores brought back many of the features of the older
cooperatives. 24 9 The general management of the Exchange was vested in a
board of five directors with broad powers and a Manager exercising
general supervision. 25 0 The Exchange denied full benefits to non-
shareholders, who were the large majority of the Alliance members, and
also charged them an extra 5% commission.25 ' Such discrimination made
some "lose [their] love and enthusiasm for the Exchange," as one farmer
put it.252 More generally, "[t]he Exchange stood removed from those too
poor to take advantage of its services."2 53
238 Id. at 75.
239 Id.
2
40 Id.
241 Id at 75-76.
242 Id. at 76.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id
246 Id. at 77.
247 Id. at 89.
248 See id. at 90 ("Wherever a cooperative failed for lack of credit, greenbackism surged like a
virus through the organizational structure of the agrarian movement.").
249 See id. ("Slowly, the Omaha Platform of the People's Party was germinating.").
250 For the Plan for Cooperative Stores submitted to the President and Members of the Farmers'
Alliance of Texas, see GARVIN & DAWS, supra note 145, at 155.
251 POSTEL, supra note 151, at 125.
252 Id.
253 id.
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When the Exchange and the joint note plan failed, Macune came up
with his boldest idea: the Subtreasury. The concept of the Subtreasury was
outlined in the report of Alliance's Committee on the Monetary System,
approved by the Alliance's 1889 St. Louis convention.25 4 The report
proposed establishing federal warehouses in every county in each state that
yielded over $500,000 worth of agricultural produce annually.255 These
warehouses would provide farmers with a place to store their crops to
await higher prices before selling.256 Farmers who stored their crop would
receive a certificate of deposit showing the amount and quality.257 They
would be permitted to borrow up to 80% of the local market price upon
storage and they could sell their subtreasury certificates of deposit at the
prevailing market price at any time of year.258 Farmers were to pay interest
at the rate of 1% per annum on the condition that they redeem the crop
within twelve months from the date of the certificate, or the trustees would
sell the crop at public auction to the highest bidder to satisfy the debt.259
Besides the 1% interest, farmers would pay small charges for grading,
storage, and insurance.260
The report concluded:
[W]ith this method in vogue, the farmer, when his product
was harvested, would place it in storage where it would be
perfectly safe and he would secure four-fifths of its value to
supply his pressing necessity for money at 1% per annum. He
would negotiate and sell his warehouse or elevator receipt
whenever the current price suited him, receiving from the
person to whom he sold only the difference between the price
agreed upon and the amount already paid to the subtreasurer .
. . . This is no new or untried scheme; it is safe and
conservative. 2 61
The New York Times described the Subtreasury plan as "one of the
wildest and most fantastic projects ever seriously proposed by a sober
man." 26 2 It was, in fact, the ultimate expression of the Alliance's idea of a
democratic economy. As Lawrence Goodwyn put it, Macune's experiences
and exasperation as a farmer led him "to a conception of the uses of
254 Report of The Committee on the Monetary System, reprinted in A POPULIST READER, supra
note 150, at 84.
2 55 
id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 id.
260 id
26 1 Id at 84-85.
262 GOODWYN, supra note 3, at 173.
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democratic government that was beyond the reach of orthodox political
theorists of the Gilded Age."26 3 The Alliance went beyond contemporary
orthodoxy in proposing to mobilize the monetary authority of the nation to
help some of its poorest citizens through the creation of a currency system
designed to benefit the "producing classes."264
Efforts to get a Subtreasury bill through Congress repeatedly failed.265
Historians explain this failure by pointing to a variety of factors, including
factionalism within the Alliance, as well as the power of traditional
political culture and the corporate state.2 66 The contest between the twin
powers of traditional politics and the corporate state of the Agrarians'
experimentalism was not an even one. The traditionalist forces were
narrow in outlook and primitive in economic theory but supported by an
enormous passive constituency and by the nation's press, universities,
banks, and churches. 2 67 The Farmers Alliance, by contrast, had only its
self-education apparatus, sympathetic local newspapers, the partial
successes of the cooperative experiment, and hope.268
Despite their nineteenth-century failures, some of the Alliance's
concepts lingered in agrarian reformers' circles and were partially
incorporated in later legislation. In 1913, President Wilson appointed a
governmental commission to study the problem of agricultural credit and
cooperation. 26 9 The commission's reports led to the Farm Loan Act of
1916, which established a system of long term agricultural credit based on
a cooperative system of twelve federal land banks. 27 0 The federal
government provided part of the capital required for the cooperative land
banks to begin operation and regulated the interest rates that could be
charged borrowers. 271 Later, the Farm Credit Act of 1933 established
production credit associations to make short term and intermediate term
loans to farmers and a system of district banks and a central bank to extend
credit to farmers' cooperative associations.2 72
263 Id. at 91.26 Id.
" Report of the Committee on the Monetary System, supra note 254, at 80.
266 Id. at 212.
267 Id
268 See id. ("The forces of reform ... deployed several regiments of stump speakers, a thousand
weekly newspaper editors, and a sizable constituency that carried strong but receding memories of the
Alliance cooperative crusade. Collectively, they had hope.").
269 COCHRANE, supra note 157, at 112.
270 Id.
271 d
272 Id. at 113.
2017]1 POPULIST PROPERTY LA W 971
III. TfE IMPLICATIONS OF POPULIST PROPERTY LAW
A. Property Law from Below
The story of the National Reformers' and the Farmers' Alliance's
efforts to influence property law builds on a body of legal and historical
scholarship that seeks to examine the law "from below."273 Most legal
history privileges the "official" lawmakers and interpreters of the law by
focusing on the decisions and writings of judges, legislators, lawyers, and
treatise writers. This prevailing mode of writing legal history assumes an
input-output model of how law is produced. In this model, non-legal (e.g.,
social, cultural, political, and economic) inputs are processed by the
official, privileged makers and interpreters of the law, then turned into
authoritative legal texts, such as statutes, cases, or treatises.274 By contrast,
"legal history from below" focuses on the contributions to the meaning of
law made by people with no official roles in the hierarchy of legal
authority.27 5 It shows that these people, such as workers, women, or
farmers, often contested official versions of the law and put forward their
own distinctive legal interpretations. 276 The story told in this Article seeks
to expand the insights of "legal history from below" in several ways.
First, in these two episodes, citizens with no official legal role or
training went beyond ignoring, overriding, or re-interpreting the official
meaning of the law: they actively sought to change it by crafting new
property forms. 27 7 In other words, workers and farmers contributed their
273 See William E. Forbath, Hendrik Hartog & Martha Minow, Introduction: Legal Histories from
Below, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 759, 759 [hereinafter Legal Histories from Below] (explaining that legal
histories from below "share an unwillingness to regard official legal texts and interpretations as the
sole-or, often, even the most significant-registers of what the law [is], in the eras and for the people
studied here"). As examples of "legal history from below," see William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of
Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767, 785, 809, 812, 817
(examining how, during the decades following the Civil War, organized labor repudiated "liberty of
contract" as "wage slavery" and forged an alternative republican constitutionalism and an alternative
vision of industrial cooperation); Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 899, 934
(exploring the practice of pig-keeping in nineteenth century New York City as a starting point for
developing a larger and more general study of the legal significance of American customs); Martha
Minow, Forming Underneath Everything that Grows:' Toward a History ofFamily Law, 1985 Wis. L.
REv. 819, 838-39 (proposing a new view of family law history that "looks underneath" traditional
family law to see family social roles mediating between law and social experience by reinforcing legal
norms, while simultaneously providing independent bases for social practices and rationales for social
change).
274 Legal Histories from Below, supra note 273, at 759, 761.
275 Id. at 760.
276 Id. at 759.
277 See Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1594, 1602 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)) (arguing that "we need to pin down the . . .
cloudy claims" of "popular constitutionalism" and distinguish between interpreting a constitution,
changing a constitution and simply ignoring or overriding one).
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creative legal input to property law. Most legal history characterizes their
input as exclusively non-legal, explaining that any such input was later
processed by professional lawmakers and translated into official property
law.278 By contrast, the story of the Reformers and the Farmers' Alliance
suggests that the folk legal craftsmanship of ordinary citizens (i.e., their
legal knowledge and imagination) is an important factor in the production
of the law. Farmers and workers believed that property law needed to be
reformed, and they mastered the building blocks of property law to directly
participate in the reform process. They were able to process their personal
experiences with the problems of access to land or credit via their
understanding of technical property concepts and to craft new property
forms.
The story of populist property law expands the theory of "legal history
from below" in a second important way: it broadens its focus to include
property law, implicating property law theory in a new and interesting
way. In recent years, "legal history from below" has focused
predominantly on constitutional law, retrieving a lost strand of "popular
constitutionalism." 2 79 Its proponents note that today we are inclined to
view law and politics as two distinct domains. 280 In politics, the people
rule, while law is reserved for a trained elite of judges and lawyers.
However, "popular constitutionalism" theorists argue, the founding
generations celebrated the central role of the people in the legal realm. 28 1
They were relied upon to supply the government with energy and direction
by improvising solutions to preserve popular control over the course of
constitutional law.282
This Article shows a similar idea at work in property law. The National
Reformers and the Farmers' Alliance saw property law as a sort of
economic constitution, like a body of law that determines the distribution
of resources and the rules of the game. They believed that, because of its
importance, property law should not be the exclusive domain of courts and
trained lawyers, and so they reclaimed control of its development.
Recognizing the existence of popular lawmaking in property law has
important implications for contemporary property theory. Descriptively, it
challenges the prevailing view of how property law is structured and
produced. Interestingly, with few exceptions, property theorists have
largely overlooked the insights that "law and society" and "history from
278 Legal Histories from Below, supra note 273, at 759, 761 ("Usually modem legal history has
characterized the inputs as non-legal .... When the inputs are legal, they are seen as drawn from the
internal needs of the legal profession and the relatively autonomous values that are identified with
lawyering and legal institutions." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
279 For the literature on "popular constitutionalism," see supra note 9.
2 KRAMER, supra note 9, at 7.
281 Id.
282 Id.
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below" scholars offer regarding popular lawmaking. In most accounts,
property law consists of a limited number of available property forms (the
fee simple, future interests, covenants, easements, leaseholds) that have
remained relatively fixed in time (the so called "numerus clausus"
principle).283 In this prevailing view, legislatures are the main institutional
actors responsible for managing the list of available property forms,
pruning old ones or accepting new ones, and judges do most of the day-to-
day work of tweaking existing forms.28 4 The story of the Reformers and the
Farmers' Alliance, however, suggests the presence of a greater degree of
innovation in development of property law and magnifies the role of actors
other than legislatures and courts. This story suggests that the friction
between legislatures, courts, and ordinary citizens led to the continuous
development of new property forms.
The story of Populist property law also has important normative
significance, because it enhances the democratic legitimacy of property
law. In recent years, democratic property theory has emerged as a powerful
alternative to long-dominant normative accounts focusing on efficiency
and information costs.285 Democratic property theory argues that, because
property law defines the relations among individuals regarding access to
resources, property forms should reflect the values and aspirations "of a
free and democratic society that treats each person with equal concern and
283 See Dorfman, supra note 1, at 467 ("[The numerus clausus] is a restriction that means that it
cannot be up to . . . private persons . . . to create new forms of property right, but only to trade rights
that take existing forms."); Merrill & Smith, supra note 1 at 10-11 ("[C]ommon-law courts behave
toward property rights (and the numerous clausus principle] very much like civil-law courts do: [t]hey
treat previously-recognized forms of property as a closed list that can be modified only by the
legislature.").
2" See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 61 (discussing the reasons for and consequences of
making legislatures the agents of change in property law and pointing at the features of legislative
decision making that make it relatively more attractive as a basis for modifying property law: clarity,
universality, comprehensiveness, stability and prospectivity); Dorfman, supra note 1, at 468-69 (noting
that numerus clausus and the related idea that legislatures are the agent responsible for change in
property law "reflect[] a concern about legitimate political authority . . . ." It signals that "private
persons lack the legitimate political authority to create new [forms of property rights]." By contrast, the
concept of political legitimation that underlies the creation of new property forms is that of democratic
self-governance).
285 For examples of theories of property law that focus on efficiency and the reduction of
information costs, see Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARv. L. REv 1691, 1691
(2012) ("Property is a platform for the rest of private law. The New Private Law takes seriously the
need for baselines in general and the traditional ones furnished by the law in particular. And nowhere is
this issue of baselines more salient than in property. I argue that the baselines that property furnishes, as
well as refinements and equitable safety valves, are shaped by information costs. For information-cost
reasons, property is, after all, a law of things."); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of
Property, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 531, 531 (2005) (proposing a "unified theory of property predicated on
the insight that property law is organized around creating and defending the value inherent in stable
ownership"). On democratic property theory, see supra note 13.
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respect." 286 Democratic property theorists also argue that, procedurally,
property forms must be ratified through the "democratically elected
legislature[]."287 However, today, representative democracy is in crisis. A
growing body of political science and legal scholarship discusses the new
anxieties that threaten our liberal, representative democracy. 28 8 These
anxieties involve both democracy's legitimacy as well as its effectiveness.
Its legitimacy is threated by the problem of unequal access. For Claus Offe,
the bedrock of democracy was "the principle of non-convertibility" 289 -
i.e., the notion that unequal social and economic assets should not convert
into unequal political influence. But today's liberal representative
democracy demonstrates both that wealth readily converts into political
influence and the consequential inequitable distribution of citizen power
that results. Democracy's ability to deliver good policy is also brought into
question by the troubling dysfunction of national legislatures. As Ira
Katznelson puts it, the ideal of a legislature where the representatives of
the community come together to make policies and laws in a way that
acknowledges and respects differences is out of reach with the reality of "a
cacophony of partisan argument, obsessive protection of intensely
interested minorities, poor legislative craftsmanship, and delegation to
courts and executive agencies." 290
These new anxieties about the legitimacy and capacity of
representative democracy have ushered in a new conversation among
political scientists and activists about the need to imagine new institutions
that would restore democracy's promises of equal access and effective
policymaking. Central to this conversation is the theme of more authentic
and efficacious forms of political participation. Political scientist Nadia
Urbinati proposes three alternative models for bringing democracy closer
to the people.29 ' One is a model of deliberative democracy where citizens
reason together on the assumption of shared interests and information. 292
21 Singer, supra note 13, at 1301.
287 di Robilant, supra note 1, at 370; Dorfman, supra note 1, at 510.
288 See Ira Katznelson, Anxieties of Democracy, BOS. REV (Sept. 8, 2015),
bostonreview.net/forum/ira-katznelson-anxieties-democracy [https://perma.cclMJC7-SDRL] ("[T]here
is a sense that constitutional democratic forms, procedures, and practices are softening in the face of
allegedly more authentic and more efficacious types of political participation-those that take place
outside representative institutions and seem closer to the people. There is also widespread anxiety that
national borders no longer define a zone of security, a place more or less safe from violent threats and
insulated from rules and conditions established by transnational institutions and seemingly inexorable
global processes.").
289 Claus Offe, Democracy in Crisis: Two and a Half Theories about the Operation of Democratic
Capitalism, OPENDEMOCRACY (July 9, 2012), https://www.opendemocracy.net/claus-offe/democracy-
in-crisis-two-and-half-theories-about-operation-of-democratic-capitalism [https://perma.cc/KJ29-
JEZ5].
2 Katznelson, supra note 288.
291 NADIA URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED: OPINION, TRUTH AND THE PEOPLE 2 (2014).
292 Id.
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Another is a robustly populist democracy where mobilized people reach
conclusions superior to those achieved by the elites. 293 And the third is a
plebiscitary democracy where policy choices are offered directly for the
people's approval. 294
Property law making has been an important laboratory for all three of
those scenarios. This "closer to the people" property law has received little
attention so far in democratic property theory, but it is visible and vital. In
recent decades, in the U.S. and in Europe, new property forms have been
introduced or revamped that seek to establish mechanisms of democratic
deliberative governance for resources as diverse as natural resources,
scarce urban land, historic landmarks, and cultural institutions. These
forms-which include the community land trust, the public trust doctrine,
common interest communities, emphyteusis, and the commons-are
crafted on the belief that, for some critical resources that involve public
interests, use and management decisions should be made not by a single
owner, whether private or public, but through a democratic, deliberative
process.
Starting in the 1990s, forms of plebiscitary property law making have
also become common. Ballot-box land use planning has sought to replace
the representative structures of traditional zoning with direct popular
participation. The idea is to give local citizens a means of directly
addressing the growth and development problems they feel their local
planning officials are unable or unwilling to remedy. And the story of
populist property law suggests that the goal of a populist democracy has
long inspired property law making. In the stories told in this Article, the
role of citizens in property law is not limited to tacit approval through their
representatives in the legislative process; it shows how they have had
direct input in the process. The stimulus for innovation came from groups
of ordinary citizens who were motivated by their own needs, narratives and
public values and developed informed views about property law reform.
The story of the Reformers and the Farmers' Alliance also enriches our
understanding of how a populist democracy would work and what
institutional reforms are needed for it to successfully achieve its goals. For
the people to be involved more directly in law making, we need to rethink
our current institutions and design new, more appropriate ones. Critics of
"popular constitutionalism" complain that the theory has been pitched at
too abstract of a level and as a consequence, it is difficult to know how it
would actually work.295 Other critics emphasize the lack of realism implicit
in the notion of "popular constitutionalism."2 96 These critics paint a bleak
293 Id2 4Id
291 Id at 166.
2
% Id at 184.
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picture of the average citizen as politically inactive and civically
ignorant.297 They insist that the average citizen lacks knowledge about
issues on the public agenda and about the fundamentals of our legal system
that would allow her to directly participate in interpreting existing law or
crafting new legal forms.2 98
The episodes of populist property law examined in this Article show
that civic renewal through organization and education is essential for
popular lawmaking to work. The National Reformers and the Farmers'
Alliance failed in some respects, but they were extremely successful in
their ability to recruit, organize, and educate their constituencies about law.
The Farmers' Alliance created their own autonomous institutions from
scratch to promote the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge. The
leaders of the Alliance taught themselves the fundamentals of political
economy and law, developing analytical abilities and the capacity to
express their proposals in technical language previously unattained by
those outside the traditional lawmaking process. They disseminated their
knowledge to the Alliance's members through their "travelling lecturers"
series. As Lawrence Goodwin has argued, the educational institutions of
the Alliance allowed its leaders to acquire individual self-respect and
enabled the movement to gain collective self-confidence. 2 99
In the case of the National Reformers, the belief in the need for
institutions for self-education and self-organization was nurtured by the
specific culture of the world of printing and printing unions. Evans was
apprenticed to a printer in Ithaca where he became immersed in the ethos
of free thinking. The printing office called itself "a chapel devoted to the
faith of reason and free discourse.""oo The Reformers promoted self-
education and free thinking through a network of an estimated six hundred
local newspapers.30 '
The efforts at self-education and self-organization of the Reformers
and the Alliance show that one does not have to hold unrealistic
expectations about the capacities of ordinary citizens to accept that the
American people should play a more direct role in lawmaking. 302
Practically speaking, the story of the Reformers and the Alliance provides
297 id.
298Id
299 GOODWYN, supra note 3, at XX.
" LAUSE, supra note 2, at 10-12.
30! See Amateur Journalism, 8 ILLUSTRATED AM. 261, 263 (1891) ("By 1877 amateur journalism,
with some six hundred newspapers in the field, had reached a commanding position.").
302 See Donnelly, supra note 9, at 162, 164 (discussing the idea of the "People's veto," a
mechanism for challenging five-to-four decisions of the Supreme Court on constitutional issues); see
also Tom Donnelly, Essay, Popular Constitutionalism, Civic Education, and the Stories We Tell Our
Children, 118 YALE L.J. 948, 966-68 (2009) (putting forth a proposal that suggests political scientists
are devoting greater attention to the role that civic education and the narratives presented in high school
history textbooks play in shaping people's beliefs about the American constitutional system).
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support for contemporary proposals of institutional reforms meant to
combat citizens' apathy and foster civic renewal.
B. Contestations and Reversals in Modern Property Law: Retrieving
Feudal Doctrines in Service ofDistributive Equity.
The story of Populist Property Law also invites a revision of the
prevailing account of the history of property law in America. Most
property law historians describe its modem development as the steady
march away from feudal restraints on the use and alienability of land
towards the free alienability and the maximally productive use of land.303
The story of Populist Property Law presents us with a different scenario.
The Reformers and the Farmers' Alliance actually reversed, at least
temporarily, this modem trend towards market alienability and
efficiency.304 This reversal has been largely overlooked by existing
historiographical accounts of property law.
The literature supporting the dominant view of the development of
modem property law is vast.305 It explains both the development of
property doctrine and its normative underpinnings. As I described in
Section 1, throughout the course of the nineteenth century, virtually every
doctrine of property law was revised to promote free alienability and
efficient use. Normatively, this trend was driven by two ideas: the
commitment to a republican form of government306 and the belief that the
market is the dominant mechanism for structuring the social order.307 As
Greg Alexander has shown, these two ideological traditions, republicanism
and market commodification, were not incompatible but rather
intertwined.308
Republicanism signified a rejection of aristocratic government in favor
of a form of government based on the consent and participation of the
governed.30 9 It also entailed a rejection of feudal relations of economic
subordination in favor of individual autonomy.310 These republican ideas,
303 See supra notes 15 (supporting the dominant account).
" William M. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1335, 1338-39 (1992)
(framing the Reformers and Farmer's Alliance movements in America as focused on "a commitment to
participation and equality in the economic sphere, and a sympathetic focus on small-scale, locally
rooted enterprise," which were generally against alienation).
305 See supra notes 15 (citing sources to this effect).
" Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 274 (1991) (interpreting the "legal meanings of property" as defined by
"American recrudescence of the classical republican tradition of political thought.").
307 See id at 293 (finding the modem debate in property theory remains focused on the "market. .
[as] the central device for allocating economic resources").
308 ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 3.
301 Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist Interpretation,
91 CORNELL L. REV. 653, 681-83 (2006).
310 Id. at 683.
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historians argue, translated into sweeping reforms of the law of inheritance
that abolished primogeniture and the entail, and led to a more restrictive
approach towards restraints on alienation.311 The rejection of feudalism
was the dominant republican theme in the contemporary commentary on
these reforms. Thomas Jefferson saw the abolition of the fee tail and
primogeniture as necessary for "every fibre [to be] ... eradicated of antient
[sic] or future aristocracy and a foundation laid for a government truly
republican."312 St. George Tucker, the most prominent legal scholar in
Virginia in 1803,313 called the entail "the offspring of feudal barbarism and
prejudice."3 14 Another commentator counted inheritance reforms, along
with the universal inoculation for smallpox and the absence of the plague,
as among the blessings enjoyed by the new nation." The poet and
diplomat Joel Barlow predicted that "the simple destruction of these two
laws, of entailment and primogeniture, if you add to it the freedom of
press, will ensure the continuance of liberty in any country."31 6
The other ideological driver of the development of property law,
market consciousness, grew in importance with the social and economic
changes of the nineteenth century.317 It soon became dominant and
partially obscured the republican theme.3 18 Market consciousness was
culturally rooted in the one of the fundamental ideas of modernity, the
belief in the possibility of endless material progress.3 19 Market
consciousness viewed the market as the privileged mechanism for
promoting progress by allowing individuals to realize their will and
preferences.32 0
This new market ideology translated into sweeping reforms in the law
of property designed to encourage the maximally productive use of land.
The two most important historiographical interpretations of modern
American property law both emphasize the role played by market
consciousness. Willard Hurst's famous "release of energy" interpretation
"' See supra text accompanying notes 99 (describing the Reformation as beginning with the
abandonment of feudal features of the English common law).
312 Hart, supra note 99, at 168 (citing Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 68-69 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892)).
313 Brewer, supra note 99, at 307.
" Id (citing Tucker, 2 Blackstone's Commentaries 119 n. 14).
3'1 STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF How, WHY, AND WHAT WE OwN 14
(2011) (citation omitted).
316 Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Brewer, supra note 99, at 307-08).
" Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception ofProperty in American Law, 1780-
1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 248, 248-49 (1972).
- See ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 7 (arguing "[t]here is no single American traditional
meaning of property" and that people wrongfully assume that "the market idea of property has
monopolized American legal thought").
319 Id. at 10.
320 See id. at 3 (addressing the "important normative commitment[] ... [of] the market as the
primary mechanism for mediating individual preferences within society").
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of American legal history321 has inspired a vast literature that describes
nineteenth-century law as promoting enterprise and the release of
individual creative energy.322 The conceptual alternative to the "release of
energy" account, Morton Horwitz's "transformation" thesis, differs
radically in methodology but has a similar focus on the rise of market
consciousness. 323 Horwitz documented in detail how, over the course of the
nineteenth century, judges, mobilized in part by a self-conscious alignment
of interests with the leaders of a rapidly expanding mercantile capitalist
class, reformed property law to permit the destruction of its older forms by
new agents of economic development.32 4 The courts viewed land almost
exclusively as a productive asset and justified all changes to the concept of
property ownership by claiming they promoted a net increase in national
wealth.325 In areas such as water law, the law of waste, or the law of
prescription, doctrines encouraging high-risk investment and "reasonable
user" balancing tests replaced anti-developmental property doctrines that
limited owners to the natural use of their land. 32 6
Some historians have questioned these accounts of the development of
property law by pointing to the apparently contradictory assumptions
underlying modem American property law.3 27 According to these theorists,
modem property doctrine has been premised on fundamentally
irreconcilable postulates of liberal ideology;3 2 8 it has sprung from ideas of
autonomy and self-determination as much as it has from ideas of
community and paternalism.32 9 Other historians have examined the
321 See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY UNITED STATES 3-32 (1956) ("Because it most valued property for its productive potential,
the nineteenth century was prepared to make strong, positive use law to maintain such conditions as it
thought essential to the main flow of private activity.").
322 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 157 (1973) ("[D]uring much of
the [nineteenth] century, there was a great deal of public sympathy for business, productivity,
growth."); KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 192 (1989) ("[E]very
state legislature [in the nineteenth century] devised legal means to compete with the equally ambitious
efforts of other states anxious to attract new enterprise."); John V. Orth, The Release of Energy:
Reflections on a Legal History Trope, 34 ADEL. L. REV. 159, 160 (2013) (examining the release of
energy trope and comparing it to the periodization of English legal history).
323 See Horwitz, supra note 317, at 290 (describing how legal doctrines of were transformed by
the concept that ownership of property contributed to increased national wealth). For a summary of the
debate over Horwitz's "transformation" thesis and its methodology, see Robert W. Gordon, Morton
Horwitz and His Critics: A Conflict ofNarratives, 37 TULSA L. REV. 915, 915-20 (2002).
324 Horwitz, supra note 317, at 248, 250.
325 Id at 290.
326 See id. at 251-61 (discussing water law); id. at 264-70 (discussing prescription); id at 279-84
(discussing waste).
327 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 106, at 113 (noting the contradiction between morality and
policy which underlies modem property law).328 Id at 102.
329 Id. at 99-105 (identifying and discussing several contradictions: facilitation vs. regulation,
autonomy vs. community, self determination vs. paternalism, formality vs. informality).
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survival of customary property forms that contradicted the faith in the
market.330 Use rights in commons, such as grazing, wood-gathering,
hunting, and fishing, are the clearest example of how obsolete remnants of
a "moral economy" of pre-market custom survived in modern property
law. 3 ' The story of Populist Property Law dramatically expands these
"revisionist" insights. The movement toward market alienability and
efficient use of the land was not as steady and linear as usually assumed-
it was marked by ideological contradictions,33 2 the survival of local
"communitarian" customs,333 and significant contestations and temporary
reversals. 33 4
As argued in Section I of this Article, the Reformers and the Alliance
sought to reverse the course of modem property law, and for some time,
they succeeded. The Homestead Act stands as the most important example
of this temporary success.3 35 The Reformers and the Alliance were
committed to the modem idea of progress, but they rejected both strands of
the modem property discourse (i.e., market consciousness and the anti-
feudalism rhetoric).336 The Reformers sought to improve the prospects of
workers in modern industrial society,337 and the Farmers' Alliance was
firmly committed to promoting agrarian progress. 338
However, while they shared in that modem sensibility, these two
groups were also convinced that the market was not the privileged
mechanism for promoting modem progress. Progress for the Reformers
and the Alliance did not mean realizing individual preferences through
market transactions. Progress meant endowing everyone with the means to
effectively realize their life plans.3 39 This could only be done by expanding
and securing long-term access to resources such as land and agricultural
credit.340 Up to that point, this idea of distributive equity had remained
marginal to the discourse of modem property law. The Reformers and the
Alliance made it the central focus of their reflections on property. In this
respect, the property discourse of these two groups was new. It rejected the
dominant market consciousness, and it also went beyond the old language
330 See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Paradoxical Property, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF
PROPERTY 95, 96 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995) (observing how English and colonial social
norms and practices contradicted absolute dominion discourse).
331 See id at 96-97 (detailing the customs which countered the model of absolute dominion).
332 KENNEDY, supra note 106, at 98-99, 102.
313 Robert W. Gordon, Paradoxical Property, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 95,
97-98 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 2014).
.. Priest, supra note 15, at 392-94.
33s See supra Section I.C.
336 See supra Section I.B.
31 See supra Section I.A.
1 See supra Section I.
. See supra Section .B.
340 See supra Section I.A.
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of republican virtue. 341
Even more striking was the Reformers' and the Alliance's rejection of
the anti-feudal rhetoric of modem property law. They retrieved doctrinal
tools that had been discarded as feudal not because they envisaged a return
to an older social order but because of their potential to effectively realize
their modern ideas about progress as distributive equity. They were
motivated by a pragmatic concern with what would "work." 342 This
pragmatism made them look beyond the pervasive rhetoric of the critique
of feudalism. The Reformers realized that anti-feudal rhetoric had
distracted the "official" property lawyers, who had failed to see that
"feudal" restraints on alienation, such as positive duties to cultivate and
exemptions from creditors, could be put to work in service of the modern
goals of making access to land and credit more equitable and secure in the
long term.
C. Making Sense of the New Populist Property Law
The story of Populist Property Law is also important because it
illuminates current developments in property law. Populist Property Law is
not merely a phenomenon of the past. It bears a striking resemblance to the
present.
To begin with, the circumstances that led to the rise of the Reformers
and the Alliance are very much like those of today. The Reformers and the
Alliance rose up against levels of wealth inequality that parallel those of
today.34 3 Over the last thirty years, wealth inequality in the United States
has grown to the point that it is now "fully back to Gilded Age levels." 344 A
recent study suggests that the wealthiest quintile holds about 84% of the
nation's wealth. 34 5 As modern America faces increasing middle-class
insecurity and rising inequality, progressives are looking to a new
economic populist agenda to expand access to resources such as housing,
credit, healthcare, and education. 346 The heirs of the Reformers and the
"' On republican virtue in the modem property discourse, see ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 26-
43.
342 See supra Section LB.
343 Paul Krugman has been particularly vocal about the New Gilded Age. Paul Krugman, Why
We're in a New Gilded Age, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 8, 2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/05/08/thomas-piketty-new-gilded-age/ [https://perna.cc/GA7F-
L8T2] (reviewing Thomas Piketty's CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY).
3" Paul Krugman, Gilded Once More, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/opinion/27krugman.html?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/4EPU-43NN];
see also TIMOTHY NOAH, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: AMERICA'S GROWING INEQUALITY CRISIS AND
WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 146-47 (2013) (providing data on income distribution in the United
States up to 2008).
345 Michael 1. Norton & Dan Ariely, Building a Better America-One Wealth Quintile at a Time,
6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCL 9, 10 (2011).
" See Paul Krugman, The Populist Imperative, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2014),
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Alliance are organizations such as Americans for Financial Reform (AFR)
and Strike Debt.347 These organizations have revived many of the
arguments about property, equality, and freedom once advanced by the
National Reformers and the Alliance, and they are proposing similar
property law innovations. The story of nineteenth-century populist
property law helps make sense of these contemporary ideas and proposals.
One of those proposals, known as "pre-distribution," has spread
rapidly from academic circles to politicians and advocacy groups.34 8
Coined by Yale political scientist Jacob Hacker, pre-distribution is the idea
that "[i]nstead of equalizing unfair market outcomes through tax-and-spend
or tax-and-transfer, we instead engineer markets to create fairer outcomes
from the beginning."34 9 Pre-distribution presents important similarities to
the concerns and the vision of the Reformers and the Alliance.
Like their nineteenth-century predecessors, many modem-day
progressives are concerned with the limited effectiveness and unpopularity
of redistribution.3"o The Farmers' Alliance believed that support for the
income tax was a hopeful sign but insufficient for real change.35 ' For their
part, the National Reformers were concerned with the unfairness of ex post
redistribution.352 Contemporary advocates of pre-distribution warn about
the limits of redistribution.3" 3 They argue that regulation that intervenes
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/opinion/krugman-the-populist-imperative.html [https://perma.cc/
3W8Q-PRPK] (noting the connection between economic inequality and lack of access to employment);
see also Michael Tomasky, A New Populism?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 6, 2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/03/06/new-populism/ [https://perma.cc/QR4Z-XFVS]
(reviewing LANE KENWORTHY, SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AMERICA (2014) and noting that progress is
inevitable).
3 See LARRY KIRSCH & ROBERT N. MAYER, FINANCIAL JUSTICE: THE PEOPLE'S CAMPAIGN TO
STOP LENDER ABUSE xiii (2013) (describing AFR and noting that "consumer, labor, civil rights, fair
lending, and community groups in Washington and across the country did come together in a way
rarely, if ever, seen before in modem-day citizen politics . . . [in] a pitched battle between newly
cemented and sometimes unusual alliances advocating for the 'people'-2000s' style-and the
traditional leviathans of Wall Street and Big Business"); STRIKE DEBT, http://strikedebt.org
[https://perma.cc/SCZ4-9GUE] (last visited Dec. 1, 2016) (Strike Debt describes itself as "a nationwide
movement of debt resisters fighting for economic justice and democratic freedom.").
. See, e.g., Martin O'Neill & Thad Williamson, The Promise of Pre-Distribution, POL'Y
NETWORK (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.policy-network.net/pno detail.aspx?ID
=4262&title=The+promise+of+pre-distribution [https://perma.cc/8Q65-KWZ8] (describing a
conference where a British politician announced that pre-distribution would be the Labour Party's new
agenda).
349 Id.
350 See, e.g., Jacob S. Hacker, The Institutional Foundations of Middle-Class Democracy, in
PRIORITIES FOR A NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY: MEMOS TO THE LEFT 33, 35 (Michael MeTeman ed.,
2011) [hereinafter Hacker, Institutional Foundations] ("[E]xcessive reliance on redistribution fosters
backlash, making taxes more salient and feeding into the conservative critique that government simply
meddles with 'natural' market rewards.").
" Supra Section II.B.
352 Supra Section lB.
.. Hacker, Institutional Foundations, supra note 350, at 35-36.
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before the distribution of entitlements is both more popular and more
effective than redistribution.35 4 It is more popular because it does not feed
into the conservative critique that government taxation "meddles with
'natural' market rewards.""' It is more effective because equalizing the
preconditions for individual economic agency has a greater potential to
change the very structure of power.35 6
There is another more fundamental affinity between the Reformers'
and the Farmers' proposals and the contemporary focus on pre-distribution.
These visions all aspire to create a democratic economy and recognize that
economic democracy requires a fair distribution of effective control over
economic resources. The Reformers envisioned a democracy of property
owners, where the government would give each citizen a capital stake,
such as a parcel of land and, in some cases, cash.357 The Farmers Alliance
called for a "democracy of producers," where access to credit and
agricultural services would be expanded through farmers' cooperatives and
the Subtreasury.358 Today, advocates of pre-distribution seek to
democratize the economy through a sweeping set of reforms in housing,
education, welfare, and financial policy that would secure widespread
ownership of productive assets and human capital.359
This vision of economic democracy that informs the contemporary pre-
distribution approach seeks to offer a fresh alternative to existing theories
of distributive justice, particularly the "equality of opportunity" approach,
which has so far dominated discussions of distributive justice. In its
narrowest formulation, formal equality of opportunity forbids the
allocation of resources and advantages based on race, sex, or sexual
orientation, but takes pre-existing inequalities, such as disadvantages
354 See, e.g., id. ("The moral of this story is that progressive reformers need to focus on market
reforms that encourage a more equal distribution of economic power and rewards even before
government collects taxes or pays out benefits.").
35 Id.
356id.
3 See supra Section I.C.
1 See supra Section I.B.
3 See Jacob Hacker, The Free Market Fantasy, POL'Y NETWORK (Apr. 23, 2014),
http://www.policy-network.net/pno detail.aspx?ID-4628&title=The-free-market-fantasy [https://
permacc/G73N-G9NH] ("Four themes should define a new predistributive agenda: a true commitment
to equality of opportunity, embodied in universal access to affordable pre-K education and college; the
encouragement of faster, more broadly shared, and more stable growth through public investment and
stronger discipline of finance; a concerted campaign to expand and improve public services so that all
citizens have access to a basic set of goods essential to human flourishing, regardless of income or
wealth; and the fostering of countervailing power and participation through the empowerment of
communities, civic organisations, and economic watchdogs, including, of course, trade unions but also
collective investors (such as pension funds) and public-interest organisations (such as anti-poverty
advocates)."); O'Neill & Williamson, supra note 348 ("The power and promise of pre-distribution is
that governments can find ways to influence the structure of the economy, to make it unrecognizably
more egalitarian and more democratic.").
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arising from social-class origin, as given.360 A broader version of equality
of opportunity, known as "compensatory" or "substantive" equality of
opportunity, views pre-existing inequalities as obstacles for which there
must be some compensation in order that all individuals have an
opportunity to compete based solely on their talents and abilities.3 61
Even in its broadest formulation, the theory of equality of opportunity
has two critical shortcomings that pre-distribution seeks to overcome. First,
equality of opportunity does not have anything to say about the inequality
of end outcomes. Equality of opportunity assumes that once individuals
have equal opportunities to fairly compete in the market, the way the
market distributes its rewards is not something we should worry about.
Second, equality of opportunity assumes a narrow-minded conception of
self-reliance and self-improvement that magnifies the relevance of
individual talents, effort, and abilities, but denies interdependence and
vulnerability.
Pre-distribution seeks to overcome these problems by placing the
question of inequality of end-outcomes front and center. It recognizes that
a society where wealth is concentrated in the hands of few is not a healthy
or just society36 and that inequality corrodes the very fabric of democracy.
Economic oligarchies breed political oligarchies that dominate and control
the polity. The Reformers and the Farmers Alliance saw the dangers of
"European-style" political despotism in America in the form of a
"moneyed aristocracy" with undue political influence.363
After recent Supreme Court decisions such as Citizens United,364
Arizona Free Enterprise,365 and McCutcheon,366 the issue of unequal
3 See JOHN ROEMER, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 1 (1998) (defining formal equality of
opportunity or the anti-discrimination principle as the idea that "in the competition for positions in
society, all individuals who possess the attributes relevant for the performance of the duties of the
position in question be included in the pool of eligible candidates, and that an individual's possible
occupancy of the position be judged only with respect to those relevant attributes.").
" See id (defining the substantive or compensatory notion of equality of opportunity as the idea
that "society should do what it can to 'level the playing field' among individuals who compete for
positions, or, more generally, that it level the playing field among individuals during their periods of
formation, so that all those with relevant potential will eventually be admissible to pools of candidates
competing for positions.").
362 See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L.
REv. 669, 670 (2014) ("As structures of opportunity have grown increasingly narrow and brittle, and
class differences have widened, the nation is becoming what reformers throughout the nineteenth and
early-twentieth century meant when they talked about a society with a 'moneyed aristocracy' or a
'ruling class' - an oligarchy, not a republic."). Fishkin and Forbath argue that "we cannot keep our
constitutional democracy - our republican form of government - without constitutional restraints
against oligarchy and a political economy that maintains a broad middle class, accessible to everyone."
Id at 669.
363 See supra Sections LA & H.A.
' Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 312 (2010) (extending First
Amendment protection to corporate political speech).
36' Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 754-55 (2011) (striking
down a program that aimed to mitigate inequalities by awarding a campaign matching funds in
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political influence is real and urgent.16 1 Markets are never self-governing;
rather, they are the product of political decisions.368 In recent years, the
rules in key areas have been distorted by powerful economic interests,
which have reshaped markets to their advantage. 369 Pre-distribution seeks
to empower the middle class and produce more equitable end outcomes.370
Pre-distribution goes beyond the narrow conceptions of self-reliance
and self-improvement of the equality of opportunity approach. It
recognizes that individuals are inherently vulnerable and that there are
structural and personal limits to their ability to lift themselves up for which
they are only indirectly responsible. Pre-distribution seeks to give
individuals not only fairly equal chances to compete in the market, but also
the ability to respond confidently to the uncertainties of the economy.3 7 1
This requires not only endowing every individual with a capital stake so
that they could be an active and participating economic agent, but also
making sure that they can hold onto their assets, regardless of the
randomness of life.372 In other words, to be confident, individuals need a
response to its opponents' spending).
" McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (plurality opinion)
(striking down aggregate contribution limits that aimed to limit the political dominance of the largest
donors by prohibiting any donor from contributing more than a set amount to federal candidates and
parties each cycle).
367 See Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 362, at 694 ("The thrust of recent Supreme Court decisions
in cases such as Citizens United, Arizona Free Enterprise, and McCutcheon v. FEC has been the
wholesale rejection of statutory efforts to in any way equalize political influence - among donors,
among candidates, among citizens. In a variety of contexts, the Court has analyzed these efforts
similarly. The Court reasons that the government has a legitimate policy interest in preventing
corruption - while defining corruption in an exceedingly narrow way. The Court holds, however, that
this effort to prevent corruption must come to terms with a powerful force: the Constitution. The sole
constitutional value in play in this story is First Amendment protections for free speech.").
* See Hacker, supra note 359 ("Markets can be enormously effective, but they aren't always and
they are never self-governing. They rest on rules of the game that inevitably advantage some players
and not others. The increasingly lax rules governing the financial sector, to take the most salient recent
example, advantaged market players willing to take on more leverage and risk without regard to the
grave systemic threats their actions posed. In the language of economics, these threats were an
'extemality'-privatised gains, socialised losses, predictable crises.").
369 See id. ("More and more research suggests that the powerful economic interests in finance and
the corporate world that have shot ahead over the last generation have in tum used their
economic power to reshape markets to their advantage, or at least to fend off measures that would limit
the externalities from carbon emissions to toxic financial assets they impose on the rest of us.").
no See id. ("'he core point of predistribution is that progressives need to think more seriously
about how the rules of the market, and the measures taken to augment and support it, encourage the
kinds of social outcomes that citizens value. The distortion of these rules in key areas from finance to
corporate governance to energy to industrial relations hinders not just growth, but also the translation of
growth into broad-based economic and social gains.").
"' See Kitty Ussher, What is Pre-Distribution?, POL'Y NETWORK (Oct. 22, 2012),
http://www.policy-network.net/pno detail.aspx?lD-4272&title=What-is-pre-distribution [https://
perma-cc/6TG8-QYGE] (discussing the "empowerment" approach to pre-distribution, "which focuses
on what is needed to ensure that an individual can respond to the uncertainties of a global economy in a
positive and confident way").3 72 id
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stake in the economy and a chance to keep it. The National Reformers saw
this in the 1860s."' Their proposals for a homestead law, including duties
to reside and restraints on alienation, were designed to limit the risk that
grantees would lose their parcels to speculators.374
D. Cautionary Tales: Is Populist Property Law Doomed to Fail?
Just as the Reformers and the Alliance did before them, organizations
such as AFR and Strike Debt have proposed their own populist property
forms.
One proposal that has attracted attention is the idea of a "sticky opt out
plain vanilla mortgage" articulated by Professor Michael Barr, a reform for
which AFR has expressed its support.3 7' The idea behind this proposal is to
make home mortgage finance safer for consumers.3 76 The mortgage crisis
revealed that brokers and lenders had been able to lure homebuyers into
mortgages that they did not understand and could not afford.377 Lenders, at
least in the short term, benefit from selling borrowers mortgages they
cannot afford,' and borrowers are not "rational agents with perfect
information and foresight."3 79 Improved disclosure may help avoid some
catastrophic outcomes, but it may not be sufficient in the face of market
pressure and consumer confusion.380
In the proposed "sticky opt-out plain-vanilla mortgage," lenders would
be required to offer eligible borrowers a standard "plain-vanilla" mortgage
(or set of mortgages) such as a fixed-rate, self-amortizing, thirty-year
mortgage loan, according to reasonable underwriting standards.3 8 1
Borrowers would receive one of these standard mortgages unless they
choose to opt out in favor of a non-standard option offered by the lender. 3 82
Given the strong market pressure to deviate from default options, to make
the default "sticky," deviation would require heightened disclosure and
373 See supra Section I.C.
37 id.
375 Barr et al., supra note 22, at 41-46; Press Coverage ofAFR's Launch, AMS. FOR FIN. REFORM,
http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2009/06/press-coverage-of-afrs-launch/ [https://permacc/ Z39N-859K]
(last visited Dec. 9, 2016).
376 See Barr et al, supra note 22, at 42 ("We thus deploy an opt-out strategy to make it easier for
borrowers to choose a standard product, and harder for borrowers to choose a product that they are less
likely to understand.").
3 See id at 41 ("[A] central problem [leading to the mortgage crisis] was that many borrowers
took out loans that they did not understand and could not afford.").
" See id. at 42 ("[IUn the short term, lenders and brokers may benefit from selling borrowers
loans they cannot afford.").
319 Id. at 25.
31 See id. at 41-42 ("Improved disclosures might help.... However, if market pressures and
consumer confusion are sufficiently strong, such disclosure may not be enough.").
381 Id at 42.
382 Id at 42-43.
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additional legal exposure for lenders.383 The "sticky opt out plain vanilla"
mortgage system, advocates argue, would improve consumers' decision
making because more uniform "plain vanilla" terms better allow
homebuyers to compare mortgage offers and to understand the key features
of the standard products.384
Another populist property law innovation proposed by activists is a
novel use of eminent domain where municipalities would use their eminent
domain power to condemn underwater mortgages and then refinance them
at market value. 38  Robert Hockett, the plan's originator, claims that the
plan will effectively solve the collective action problems that make
principal write downs of securitized mortgage loans difficult.386 First, there
is a last-mover advantage where write downs are concerned: absent
orchestration by a collective agent, individual mortgagees benefit by
waiting for others to revalue first.387 "Everyone else's revaluing eliminates
debt overhang, thereby lowers aggregate default risk, and so raises
property prices. That in turn lessens the degree to which any last mortgage
remains underwater . . . ."88 In this situation, then, the last one to revalue
has the least need to revalue. 389 Second, many of the pooling and servicing
agreements, drafted in the bubble years, vest authority to collect loan
payments in a single collective agent, the servicer, but require
supermajority voting among mortgage-backed securities holders before
loans can be modified. 390 These bondholders, geographically dispersed and
unknown to one another, cannot collectively bargain with borrowers or
buyers on workouts or prices.39' According to Hockett, the municipal
383 Id. at 43. The authors discuss two approaches to making the default "sticky." The first
approach uses an objective reasonableness standard akin to that used for warranty analysis under the
Uniform Commercial Code. Id. Under that approach, if the court determined that the disclosure did not
sufficiently communicate the key terms and risks of the mortgage, the court could modify or rescind the
loan. Id Under the second approach, banking agencies would be responsible for supervising the nature
of disclosures according to a reasonableness standard and would impose a fine on the lender or order
other corrective actions if disclosures were found to be unreasonable. Id.
` Id at 43-44.
385 Hockett, Village, supra note 23, at 150-52. According to Hockett's plan, private investors
would convey funds to trusts organized and maintained by municipalities. Municipalities would use
these funds to condemn underwater mortgages from private-label securitization trusts, paying fair
market value. Id at 150-51. The municipalities would then work with homeowners to restructure the
underwater loans, on which they owe and which municipalities now hold, in an amount corresponding
to the level at which the mortgagor can obtain new financing in the current mortgage loan market. Id at
151. Once that is done, the new restructured loans are conveyed to the municipalities-organized trust,
which conveys resultant funds to investors. Id.
" See id. at 149 ("The Municipal Plan is designed specifically to sidestep all of the unnecessary
impediments that presently block meaningful debt revaluation and attendant value maximization.").
387 See id at I 38 ("Every mortgagee ... has reason to wish to be last. . .
388 Id
389 Id
3 Id. at 139-40.
39. Id at 139 ("The fragmentation of ownership interests both in pools of mortgage loans and,
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government exercising its traditional eminent domain authority is the
optimally situated agent to solve these collective action problems.3 92 Since
cities decline when their residents are evicted, properties deteriorate, and
crime levels rise, protecting residents and preventing blight epitomize the
types of public purpose that justify the exercise of eminent domain
authority.3 93
The fate of these proposals resembles that of the earlier forms of
populist property law. The plain-vanilla proposal was incorporated into the
bill creating the Consumer Financial Protection Agency (later known as the
"Dodd-Frank Act") in 2009,394 but it was dead on arrival. Industry
advocates claimed that it would "go too far" and "would be too intrusive in
the marketplace."3 95 The plain-vanilla idea turned into a "political lightning
rod," and before the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act could
become law, the "plain-vanilla" feature had to be removed.3 96
The eminent domain plan did not go anywhere either. The opposition
from the Securities Industry, Financial Markets Association, and the
Federal Housing Finance Agency induced caution.39 7 Cities in California's
San Bernardino County explored the idea but ultimately passed on the
eminent domain plan. 398
thereby, even the individual mortgage loans themselves, renders it impossible for creditors to act in
concert to modify underlying loans. There is no way for these hundreds of thousands of people even to
find one another, let alone act together.").
3 92 Id. at 150.
393 d
394 See Joe Adler, How Bank-Defeated 'Plain Vanilla' Requirements Live On, NAT'L MORTG.
NEWS (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/features/How-Bank-Defeated-Plain-
Vanilla-Mortgage-Requirements-Live-On-1039717-I.htmi [https://perma.ccl7GVQ-8ZVD] (noting
how the plain-vanilla idea was included in the initial Dodd-Frank bill proposal); Triumph of the
Regulators: The Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Bill Doubles Down on the Same System That Failed,
WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SBl0001424052748703615104575328993006115992 [https://perma.cc/KC52-24S4] ("Congressman
Paul Kanjorski ... offered a motion to memorialize [the bill] as the Dodd-Frank Act.").
. Adler, supra note 394 (quoting Michael Barr, former senior Treasury Department official).
396 KIRSCH & MAYER, supra note 347, at 84.
... See Statement, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Statement on Eminent Domain (Aug. 8, 2013),
http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Statement-on-Eminent-Domain.aspx [https://
perma.cc/C58E-THBS] (stating that the Federal Housing Finance Administration has "serious
concerns" about the use of eminent domain and reserving the right to exercise its statutory authorities
in response to eminent domain action); Alexis Goldstein, Wall Street Group Aggressively Lobbied a
Federal Agency to Thwart Eminent Domain Plans, NATION (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://www.thenation.com/article/wall-street-group-aggressively-lobbied-federal-agency-thwart-
eminent-domain-plans/ [https://perma-cc/9W9V-ZW9V] (discussing how the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association, one of Wall Street's trade groups, lobbied forcefully against eminent
domain to the FHFA).
. See Alejandro Lazo, San Bernardino County Abandons Mortgage Plan, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25,
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/25/business/la-fi-eminent-domain-20130125
[https://perma.cc/4MCU-EK69] ("San Bernardino County and two of its cities abandoned a plan that
would use eminent domain to seize troubled mortgages and write down debt for homeowners. . . . [The
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This raises the question of whether populist property law is doomed to
fail. Is popular lawmaking inevitably going to deliver reforms that are too
radical and unworkable? The story of Nineteenth century populist property
law suggests that we should not be too pessimistic. Despite their apparent
failure, the Homestead Act and the Subtreasury plan had a lasting impact.
First, populist property law plays an important constitutive role because it
shapes people's consciousness about what entitlements they deserve.399 By
generating expectations about the political and economic structure we live
in, it suggests new avenues by which people can make claims. For
example, the Homestead Act made nineteenth-century Americans
internalize the expectation of an essentially universal entitlement. It
consolidated the expectation that the public domain, "held in trust by the
government, would be delivered to its rightful owners: all of 'the
People." 00 This new entitlement consciousness helped create a broader
welfare rights mentality that was critical to the development of an
American welfare state later in the early twentieth century.401
The new Populist property forms may have a similar constitutive
effect. Both the plain-vanilla mortgage and the eminent domain plan have
generated a great deal of attention among consumers and homeowners,
shaping expectations and generating new demands. For example, the plain-
vanilla mortgage proposal has helped embed new expectations about safety
in home mortgage finance. Discussions of the plain-vanilla option have
helped dispel the narrative that blames the mortgage crisis on homebuyers
who "knowingly signed mortgage contracts they cannot now afford to
honor."4 02 Debates over the plain-vanilla option have also consolidated the
public's awareness of the combined effects of market pressure and the
cognitive and behavioral failures in home mortgage finance. Whatever the
County] said it gave up on the eminent domain plan because of its lack of public support.").
" On law's "constitutive effect," see Robin Stryker, Mechanisms of Legal Efect: Perspectives
on the Law & Society Tradition, in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW RESEARCH METHODS MONOGRAPH SERIES 2
(2012) (explaining that "law and society scholars refer to law's 'constitutive' effects - that is, law's
power to make, and make sense of, the social world"); JENSEN, supra note 119, at 11 (discussing how
land grants and pensions for veterans of the Revolutionary war had important constitutive effects,
creating formal categories of citizens' deservingness, suggesting new avenues to make claims and
demands, and generating new expectations about the Federal role).
o JENSEN, supra note l19, at 191 (internal citations omitted).
4' See id at 5-6, 8-10, 33 (arguing that the land grants and pensions for veterans of the
Revolutionary War helped embed a notion of "entitlements" that later paved the way for the New Deal
welfare state and later for the welfare rights revolution of the 1960s and early 1970s).
402 Eli Lehrer, Subprime Borrowers: Not Innocents, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., https://cei.org/
op-eds-and-articles/subprime-borrowers-not-innocents [https://perma~cc/P3NH-CYMA] (Dec. 11,
2007) (originally posted on BusinessWeek); cf Daniel Gross, Subprime Suspects, SLATE (OCT. 7,2008,
2:08 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2008/10/subprime suspects.html
[https://perma.cc/2WL3-LVLE] (arguing that the financial credit crisis was caused by investment banks
recklessly giving out and trading large loans, not by banks lending money to poor minority
homeowners).
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fate of the plain-vanilla proposal, Americans now expect and demand
better product regulation, informed by the realities of market pressure and
the insights of behavioral science about consumers' choices. Additionally,
the eminent domain plan may have constitutive effects by helping to
embed a broader understanding of what counts as a "public purpose" in
takings' jurisprudence. In other words, citizens familiar with the eminent
domain plan may become more receptive to the idea that preserving
neighborhood integrity, property values, the revenue bases from which
municipalities fund services, and enabling residents to remain in their own
homes are "public purposes."403
In addition to this constitutive effect, populist property law has another
important effect. While populist property law may deliver solutions that
appear radical and unrealistic when they are first proposed, those solutions
may prove useful under different conditions. In other words, while popular
lawmaking may not be of immediate application, it expands the repertory
of solutions available in the future. For example, as suggested in Section 1,
the expansive homestead proposal of the National Reformers helped fuel a
debate on how to improve the narrower Homestead Act of 1862 after a
new "panic" made its failures apparent.40 4 Similarly, the Subtreasury
system informed both the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in
1913 and the New Deal's farm programs two decades later. 405 Today, the
idea behind the plain-vanilla proposal has not died. The concept of
anchoring the home mortgage market to a safer and fairer product lived on
in Dodd Frank's "Qualified Mortgage,"4 06 a type of mortgage privileged by
the Act in order to incentivize lenders to offer them instead of other types
of mortgages.40 7 As to the eminent domain plan, as noted in a Huffington
Post article:
Perhaps the mere threat that local and state governments
might get serious about using eminent domain to seize
underwater mortgages might be enough to get banks to do
a See Hockett, Village, supra note 23, at 156, 169 (arguing that in light of Midkiff the plan to
condemn underwater mortgages satisfies the public purpose requirement. It would allow municipalities
to "preserve neighborhood integrity, property values, and the revenue base from which [they] fund
services." In addition, the plan would enable residents to remain in their own homes and eliminate
"debt overhang." Even the "landlords" in this case "overwhelmingly wish to write down principal but
are prevented from doing so by the collective action challenges . . . ." Furthermore, they hold property
rights that are "much more attenuated than those of literal landlords, owning as they do only repayment
rights and security interests").
* See generally supra Section I.C.
* See supra Section II.C.
46 David Reiss, Message In a Mortgage. What Dodd-Frank's "Qualified Mortgage" Tells Us
About Ourselves, 31 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 717, 721 (2012).
7 Id. at 721, 721 n.12 (citing Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 941(b), 1411(a)(2)
(2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-1 1(c)(1)(G)(ii), 1639c(a) (2012)) (explaining the requirements for
a "Qualified Mortgage").
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something they have been loathe to do from the beginning:
write down principal and right-size mortgages to align them
with current property values. Such actions would bring
much-needed relief to hundreds of thousands of borrowers
and make up somewhat for the trillions in homeowner losses
that resulted from the shoddy bank practices of the last
decade.408
CONCLUSION
The story of populist property law poses new challenges for property
scholars beyond the scope of this Article.
The first is to think creatively about how to tackle inequality through
property law. At a time when wealth and income inequality is on the rise,
scholars and policymakers are debating the possibility of addressing
inequality through property law. At first glance, American property law
appears to have historically been more ideologically committed and
technically better equipped to protect those who already own property and
to facilitate their efficient use of that property than to promote a more
equitable distribution of property. The Framers were concerned with the
vulnerability of property in a republic and believed the protection of
private property was central to the American constitutional government. As
Jennifer Nedelsky wrote, "With property as the paradigmatic instance of
the vulnerability of rights in a democracy, inequality became both a
presumption and an object of protection . . . ."409 In other words, there
appears to be a tension between progressives' ambitions to use property
law to target inequality and restrictive assumptions about what can be done
within American property law. The story of how the National Reformers
and the Farmers' Alliance translated their ideas about equality into new
creative property forms should inspire contemporary property lawyers. It
encourages us to shift the focus of property law back to the need to expand
access to key economic resources, and invites us to think outside the box
when it comes to working with existing property forms.
The second challenge posed by the story of populist property law is to
enhance the democratic legitimacy of property law by fostering citizens'
participation and building on their input. The National Reformers and the
Farmers' Alliance exemplify successful grassroots organization and the
prospects of progressive change through citizen participation. However,
discussions of their visions and proposals have so far occurred largely
" Ray Brescia, Returning to Eminent Domain for Underwater Mortgages: Speak Quietly and
Swing a Big Stick, HUFFINGTON POST (last updated Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
ray-brescia/retuming-to-eminent-doma_b_5865338.html [https://perma.cc/2L9W-2KSE].
409 JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 1 (1990).
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outside of expert property circles. In other words, "official" property
lawyers and "folk" property lawyers have not been speaking with each
other. Today, property theory needs to be in closer touch with the
suggestions that come from the new wave of citizens' activism that was
spurred by the financial crisis.

